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ABSTRACT 
Algorithms, particularly of the machine learning (ML) variety, are 
increasingly important to individualsÕ lives, but have caused a range of concerns 
evolving mainly around unfairness, discrimination and opacity. Transparency in 
the form of a Òright to an explanationÓ has emerged as a compellingly attractive 
remedy since it intuitively presents as a means to Òopen the black boxÓ, hence 
allowing individual challenge and redress, as well as potential to instil 
accountability to the public in ML systems. In the general furore over 
algorithmic bias and other issues laid out in section 2, any remedy in a storm 
has looked attractive. 
However, we argue that a right to an explanation in the GDPR is unlikely to 
be a complete remedy to algorithmic harms, particularly in some of the core 
Òalgorithmic war storiesÓ that have shaped recent attitudes in this domain. We 
present several reasons for this conclusion. First (section 3), the law is restrictive 
on when any explanation-related right can be triggered, and in many places is 
unclear, or even seems paradoxical. Second (section 4), even were some of these 
restrictions to be navigated, the way that explanations are conceived of legally 
Ñ as Òmeaningful information about the logic of processingÓ Ñ is unlikely to be 
provided by the kind of ML ÒexplanationsÓ computer scientists have been 
developing. ML explanations are restricted both by the type of explanation 
sought, the multi-dimensionality of the domain and the type of user seeking an 
explanation. However Òsubject-centric" explanations (SCEs), which restrict 
explanations to particular regions of a model around a query, show promise for 
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interactive exploration, as do pedagogical rather than decompositional 
explanations in dodging developers' worries of IP or trade secrets disclosure. 
As an interim conclusion then, while convinced that recent research in ML 
explanations shows promise, we fear that the search for a "right to an 
explanation" in the GDPR may be at best distracting, and at worst nurture a new 
kind of Òtransparency fallacy". However, in our final sections, we argue that 
other parts of the GDPR related (i) to other individual rights including the right 
to erasure ("right to be forgotten") and the right to data portability and (ii) to 
privacy by design, Data Protection Impact Assessments and certification and 
privacy seals, may have the seeds we can use to build a more responsible, 
explicable and user-friendly algorithmic society. 
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1! INTRODUCTION 
Increasingly, algorithms regulate our lives. Decisions vital to our welfare and 
freedoms are made using and supported by algorithms that improve with data: 
machine learning (ML) systems. Some of these mediate channels of 
communication and advertising on social media platforms, search engines or 
news websites used by billions. Others are being used to arrive at decisions vital 
to individuals, in areas such as finance, housing, employment, education or 
justice. Algorithmic systems are thus increasingly familiar, even vital, in both 
private, public and domestic sectors of life. 
The public has only relatively recently become aware of the ways in which 
their fortunes may be governed by systems they do not understand, and feel 
they cannot control; and they do not like it. Hopes of feeling in control of these 
systems are dashed by their hiddenness, their ubiquity, their opacity, and the 
lack of obvious means to challenge them when they produce unexpected, 
damaging, unfair or discriminatory results. Once, people talked in hushed tones 
about Òthe marketÓ and how its invisible hand governed and judged their lives 
in impenetrable ways: now it is observable that there is similar talk about Òthe 
algorithmÓ, as in: ÒI donÕt know why the algorithm sent me these advertsÓ or ÒI 
hate that algorithmÓ.1 Alternatively, algorithms may be seen as a magic elixir 
that can somehow mysteriously solve hitherto unassailable problems in society2. 
It seems that we are all now to some extent, Òslaves to the algorithmÓ. In his 
landmark book, Frank Pasquale describes this as Òthe black box societyÓ3, and 
the issue more broadly has become a subject of attention internationally by 
regulators, expert bodies, politicians and legislatures.4 
                                                      
1 See, e.g., Tania Bucher, The algorithmic imaginary: Exploring the ordinary affects of 
Facebook algorithms, 20 INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION AND SOCIETY 1 (2015), 
doi:10.1080/1369118X.2016.1154086. 
2 See, with perfect concision, Here to Help, XKCD (last visited May 25, 2017), 
https://xkcd.com/1831/ 
3 FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND 
INFORMATION (Harvard University Press, 2015). 
4 For regulators, see INFORMATION COMMISSIONERS OFFICE (ICO), BIG DATA, ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE, MACHINE LEARNING AND DATA PROTECTION (2017); EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION 
SUPERVISOR (EDPS), MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF BIG DATA: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY, USER CONTROL, 
DATA PROTECTION BY DESIGN AND ACCOUNTABILITY [OPINION 7/2015] (2015). 
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There has been a flurry of interest in a so-called Ôright to an explanationÕ that 
has been claimed to have been introduced in the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR)5. This claim was fuelled in part by a short conference paper 
presented at a ML conference workshop6, which has received considerable 
attention in the media7. However a similar remedy had existed8 in the EU Data 
Protection Directive (DPD), which preceded the GDPR, since 19959. This 
remedy held promise with its updated translation into the GDPR, yet in the 
highly restricted and unclear form it has taken, it may actually provide far less 
help for these seeking control over algorithmic decision making than the hype 
would indicate. 
Restrictions identified within the GDPR, arts 22 and 15(h) (the provisions 
most often identified as useful candidates for providing algorithmic remedies) 
                                                      
For expert bodies, see ROYAL SOCIETY, MACHINE LEARNING: THE POWER AND PROMISE OF 
COMPUTERS THAT LEARN BY EXAMPLE. (2017); Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid 
[Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR)], Big data in een vrije en veilige 
samenleving [Big data in a free and safe society], WRR-RAPPORT 95 (2016); NESTA, MACHINES THAT 
LEARN IN THE WILD: MACHINE LEARNING CAPABILITIES, LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS (2015). Politicians 
have joined these calls. See Fabian Reinbold, Warum Merkel an die Algorithmen wil, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE (26 Oct 2016) [https://perma.cc/D2V9-XEDA]; JEREMY CORBYN, DIGITAL DEMOCRACY 
MANIFESTO (2017); BENOëT HAMON, MON PROJECT POUR FAIRE BATTER LE CÎUR DE FRANCE (2017). For 
legislative and governmental interest, see Commons Science and Technology Select Committee, 
Algorithms in decision-making inquiry launched, UK PARLIAMENT (Feb. 28, 2017), 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/science-and-
technology-committee/news-parliament-2015/algorithms-in-decision-making-inquiry-launch-
16-17/ [https://perma.cc/PJX2-XT7X]; in relation to AI more broadly see NATIONAL SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF AI (2016), [https://perma.cc/6CDM-VR3V] 
(undertaken under the Obama administration, only in archive). 
5 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (hereafter ÒGDPRÓ). 
6 Bryce Goodman and Seth Flaxman, EU regulations on algorithmic decision making and Òa 
right to an explanationÓ, 2016 ICML WORKSHOP ON HUMAN INTERPRETABILITY IN ML (2016). 
7 For a representative example from UK, see Ian Sample, AI watchdog needed to regulate 
automated decision-making, say experts, THE GUARDIAN, (Jan. 27, 2017), 
[https://perma.cc/TW2C-MZWX]. 
8 There is a long history of work into explanation facilities, previously referred to as 
ÒscrutabilityÓ in Web Science. See, e.g., Judy Kay, Scrutable adaptation: Because we can and must, 
(2006), in ADAPTIVE HYPERMEDIA AND ADAPTIVE WEB-BASED SYSTEMS (V.P. Wade et al. eds., 
Springer, 2006). 
9 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (hereafter ÒData Protection DirectiveÓ or ÒDPDÓ). 
For earlier discussions concerning what is now referred to as a Òright to an explanationÓ, see 
Alfred Kobsa, Tailoring privacy to usersÕ needs, in USER MODELING, (M. Bauer et al. eds., Springer, 
2001) (doi:10.1007/3-540-44566-8_52); Mireille Hildebrandt, Profiling and the rule of law, 1 
IDENTITY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 1, 55 (2008) [doi:10.1007/s12394-008-0003-1] 
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include: carve-outs for intellectual property (IP) protection and trade secrets10; 
restriction of application to decisions that are ÒsolelyÓ made by automated 
systems; restriction to decisions that produce ÒlegalÓ or similarly ÒsignificantÓ 
effects ; the timing of such a remedy in relation to the decision being made; the 
authorisation of stronger aspects of these remedies by non-binding recitals 
rather than the GDPRÕs main text, leading to substantial legal uncertainty; and 
the practical difficulty in knowing when or how decisions are being made, 
particularly in relation to ÒsmartÓ environments.11 Given the volume of media 
and literature attention currently being paid to this possible Òright to an 
explanationÓ, our interest is threefold: what type of remedies currently exist in 
European law, how can they be meaningfully implemented, and are these the 
remedies one would really start from given a free hand. 
This paper explores explanation as a remedy for the challenges of the ML 
era, from a European legal, and technical, perspective, and asks whether a right 
to an explanation is really the right we should seek. We open by limiting our 
scrutiny of ÒalgorithmsÓ in this paper to complex ML systems which identify and 
utilise patterns in data, and go on to explore perceived challenges and harms 
attributed to the growing use of these systems in practice. Harms such as 
discrimination, unfairness, privacy and opacity, are increasingly well explored 
in both the legal and ML literature, so here only highlighted to found subsequent 
arguments. We then continue on slightly less well travelled land to ask if 
transparency, in the form of explanation rights, is really as useful a remedy for 
taming the algorithm as it intuitively seems to be. Transparency has long been 
regarded as the logical first step to getting redress and vindication of rights, 
familiar from institutions like due process and freedom of information, and is 
now being ported as a prime solution to algorithmic concerns such as unfairness 
and discrimination. But given the difficulty in finding ÒmeaningfulÓ explanations 
(explored below), we ask if this may be a non-fruitful path to take. 
We then consider what explanation rights the GDPR actually provides, and 
how they might work out in practice to help data subjects. To do this, we draw 
upon several salient algorithmic Ôwar storiesÕ picked up by the media, that have 
heavily characterised academic and practitioner discussion at conferences and 
workshops. It turns out that because of the restrictions alluded to above, the 
GDPR rights would often likely have been of little assistance to data subjects 
ÒharmedÓ or ÒsignificantlyÓ affected by algorithmic decision-making. 
This exercise also identifies a further problem: DP remedies are 
fundamentally based around individual rights Ñ since the system itself derives 
                                                      
10 Rosemary Jay, UK Data Protection Act 1998 Ñ the Human Rights Context, 14 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW, COMPUTERS & TECHNOLOGY 3, 385, (2000) 
(doi:10.1080/713673366). 
11 Sandra Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not 
Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation, __ INTERNATIONAL DATA PRIVACY LAW __ 
(forthcoming), doi:10.1093/idpl/ipx005; Mireille Hildebrandt, The Dawn of Critical 
Transparency Right for the Profiling Era, in DIGITAL ENLIGHTENMENT YEARBOOK 2012 (J. Bus et al. 
eds., IOS Press, 2012).  
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from a human rights paradigm Ñ while algorithmic harms typically arise from 
how systems classify or stigmatise groups. While this problem is known as a 
longstanding issue in both             privacy and equality law, it remains 
underexplored in the context of the Òright to an explanationÓ in ML systems. 
Next, we consider how a right to a ÒmeaningfulÓ explanation might 
practically be actioned given current technologies. First, we identify two types 
of algorithmic explanations: model-centric explanations (MCEs) and subject-
centric explanations (SCEs). While the latter may be more promising for data 
subjects seeking individual remedies, the quality of explanations may be 
depreciated by factors such as the multi-dimensional nature of the decision the 
system is concerned with; and the type of individual who is asking for an 
explanation. 
On a more positive note though, we observe that explanations may usefully 
be developed for purposes other than to vindicate data subject rights. Firstly, 
they may help users to trust and make better use of ML systems by helping them 
to make better Òmental mapsÓ of how the model works; secondly, pedagogical 
explanations (a model-of-a-model), rather than those made by decomposition 
(explaining it using the innards) may avoid the need to disclose protected IP or 
trade secrets in the model, a problem often raised in the literature. 
After thus taking legal and technological stock, we conclude that there is 
some danger of research and legislative efforts being devoted to creating rights 
to a form of transparency that may not be feasible, and may not match user 
needs. As the history of industries like finance and credit shows, rights to 
transparency do not necessarily secure substantive justice or effective 
remedies.12 We are in danger of creating a Òmeaningless transparencyÓ 
paradigm to match the already well known Òmeaningless consentÓ trope. 
After this interim conclusion, we move on to discussing in outline what 
useful remedies relating to algorithmic governance may be derived from the 
GDPR other than a Òright to an explanationÓ. First, the connected rights-based 
remedies of erasure (Òright to be forgottenÓ) and data portability, in arts 17 and 
20 respectively, may in certain cases be as useful, if not more so, than a Òright 
to an explanationÓ. Their application to inferences however, is still unclear and 
up for grabs. 
Second, we consider several novel provisions in the GDPR which do not, as 
is traditional, give individuals rights, but try to provide a societal framework for 
better privacy practices and design: requirements for Data Protection Impact 
Assessments (DPIAs) and privacy by design (PbD), as well as non-mandatory 
privacy seals and certification schemes. These provisions, unlike explanation 
strategies, may help produce both more useful and more explicable ML systems. 
From these we suggest that we should perhaps be less concerned with 
providing individual rights on demand to data subjects and more concerned 
                                                      
12 See, e.g., Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a 
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 1 (2014); 
Pasquale, supra note 3. 
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both with (a) building better ML systems ab initio and (b) empowering agencies 
such as NGOs, regulators or civil society scrutiny organisations not simply to 
challenge ML decisions on behalf of individuals, but to review the accuracy, lack 
of bias and integrity of a ML system in the round. US legal literature has begun 
to explore these options using its due process literature and public oversight 
experiences, with suggestions such as Òan FDA for algorithmsÓ13 and variants on 
Òbig data due processÓ.14 However these solutions are currently largely 
aspirational, partly because the US lacks a clear omnibus legal regime around 
personal data to build on. European law, by contrast, provides a panoply of 
remedies in the GDPR that could be pressed into service immediately (or at least 
from May 2018 when it becomes mandatory law). Such approaches certainly 
come with their own challenges, but may take us closer to taming and using, 
rather than being ÔenslavedÕ by, algorithms. 
2! ALGORITHMS, AND HOW WE SLAVE TO THEM 
Cast broadly, an algorithm is Òany process that can be carried out 
automaticallyÓ.15 For our purposes, this definition is too wide to be helpful. 
Software has long been used for important decision-support, and this decision 
support has not existed within a governance vacuum. Such systems have 
received plenty of unsung scrutiny in recent years across a range of domains. 
For example, in the public sector, a 2013 inventory of Ôbusiness critical modelsÕ 
in the UK government described and categorised over 500 algorithmic models 
used at the national level, and the quality assurance mechanisms that been 
carried out behind them.16 
The algorithmic turn17 that has been at the end of most recent publicity and 
concern relates to the use of technologies that do not model broad or abstract 
phenomena such as the climate, the economy or urban traffic, but model varied 
entities Ñ usually people, groups or firms. These systems Ð discussed in detail 
below -  are primarily designed either to anticipate outcomes that are not yet 
knowable for sure, such as whether an individual or firm will repay a loan, or 
jump bail, or to detect and subjectively classify something unknown but 
somehow knowable using inference rather than direct measurement Ñ such as 
whether a submitted tax return is fraudulent or not. 
                                                      
13 Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83 (2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2747994.  
14 Crawford and Schultz, supra note 12; Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1249  (2008) 
15 A HISTORY OF ALGORITHMS: FROM THE PEBBLE TO THE MICROCHIP (Jean-Luc Chabert et al. eds., 
Springer, 1999). 
16 HM TREASURY, REVIEW OF QUALITY ASSURANCE OF GOVERNMENT MODELS: FINAL REPORT (HM 
Government, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/review-of-quality-
assurance-of-government-models 
17 A variation on the more legally familiar ÒcomputationalÓ turn. See generally PRIVACY, DUE 
PROCESS AND THE COMPUTATIONAL TURN (Mireille Hildebrandt and Katja de Vries eds., Routledge, 
2013). 
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Lawyers involved with technology historically have experience in this area 
relating to rule-based Òexpert systemsÓ, although the substantive impact of these 
technologies on lawyering has been relatively small compared to grand early 
expectations of wholesale replacement of imperfect human justice by 
computerised judges and arbitrators. Endeavours to create the Òfuture of lawÓ 
with expert systems in the 80s and 90s, whereby law would be formalised into 
reproducible rules, have largely been regarded as a failure except in some highly 
specific, syntactically complex but semantically un-troubling domains.18 Not all 
scholars bought into this utopian vision uncritically Ñ indeed, law was one of 
the earliest domains to be concerned about the application of ML systems 
without clear explanation facilities.19 The explanation facilities that were 
developed in the era of expert systems set a high, albeit often overlooked, bar 
for todayÕs discussions. 
2.1! The rise of learning algorithms 
Progress in automated decision-making and decision support systems was 
initially held back by a lack of large-scale data and algorithmic architectures 
that could leverage them, restraining systems to the relatively simplistic 
problems. In recent years, technologies capable of coping with more input data 
and highly non-linear correlations have been developed, allowing the modelling 
of social phenomena at a level of accuracy that is considerably more 
operationally useful. For a large part, this has been due to the move away from 
manually specified rule-based algorithms (such as the early legal systems noted 
above), where explicitly defined logics (ÒrulesÓ) turn input variables, such as 
credit card transaction information, into output variables, such as a flag for 
fraud, toward complex ML algorithms, where output variables and input 
variables together are fed into an algorithm theoretically demonstrated to be 
able to ÒlearnÓ from data. This process trains a model exhibiting implicit, rather 
than explicit, logics.20 The learning algorithms that make this possible are often 
not blazingly new, many dating from the 70s, 80s and 90s, but as we now have 
comparatively huge volumes of data that can be stored and processed cheaply, 
                                                      
18 See most notably Richard Susskind, Expert Systems in Law (Clarendon Press, 1989); John 
Zeleznikow and Dan Hunter, Building Intelligent Legal Information Systems: Representation 
and reasoning in law (Kluwer, 1994); see also one of the authorsÕ early rule based system efforts 
at Lilian Edwards and John A.K. Huntley, Creating a civil jurisdiction adviser, 1 INFORMATION & 
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY LAW 1, 5-40 (1992), doi:10.1080/13600834.1992.9965640. 
19 See, e.g., John Zeleznikow and Andrew Stranieri, The split-up system: integrating neural 
networks and rule-based reasoning in the legal domain, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW, COLLEGE PARK, MARYLAND, USA, MAY 21 - 24 
(1995), doi:10.1145/222092.222235 
20 There are a range of machine learning techniques that explicitly encode logic. For more 
information, see the field of inductive logic programming. These techniques are currently mainly 
found in natural language processing and in bioinformatics, and we do not focus on them in this 
work. 
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both the performance of and the speed of both deploying and further 
researching into ML systems has greatly increased. 
Two main relevant forms of ML exist, which relate to the type of input data 
we have. Supervised learning takes a vector of variables21, such as physical 
symptoms or characteristics, and a ÒcorrectÓ label for this vector, such as a 
medical diagnosis, known as a Òground truthÓ. The aim of supervised learning 
is to accurately predict this ground truth from the input variables in cases where 
we only have the latter. Unsupervised learning is not ÔsupervisedÕ by the ground 
truth: ML systems instead try to infer structure and groups based on other 
heuristics, such as proximity. Here, we might be interested in seeing which 
physical characteristics we could think of as ÔclusteredÕ together, without 
knowing immediately what such as cluster might mean.22 Segmentation by 
market researchers, for example, would be a relevant field where unsupervised 
learning might be fruitfully applied, as here, we are interested in finding the 
most relevant groups for a given task. 
Designers of ML systems formalise a supervised or unsupervised learning 
approach as a learning algorithm. This software is then run over historical 
training data. At various stages, designers usually use parts of this training data 
that the process has not yet ÒseenÓ to test its ability to predict, and refine the 
process on the basis of its performance23. At the end of this process, a model has 
been created, which can be queried with input data, usually for predictive 
purposes. Because these ML models are induced, they can be complex and 
incomprehensible to humans. They were generated with predictive performance 
rather than interpretability as a priority. The meaning of ÒlearningÓ in this 
context refers to whether the model improves at a specified task, as measured 
by a chosen measure of performance.24 Evaluation, management and 
improvement of the resulting complex model is achieved not through the 
interrogation of its internal structure, but through examining how it ÔbehavesÕ 
externally Ñ using performance metrics such as accuracy25, for example. 
ML is the focus of this piece, for several reasons. In our current 
interconnected, data-driven society, only ML systems have demonstrated the 
                                                      
21 For those familiar with spreadsheet software, envisaging a document where variables Ñ 
such as age, income and marital status Ñ  are columns, and observations Ñ such as one 
individual measured in one year Ñ are rows, a vector of variables would be the same as 
selecting one row. 
22 Other types of learning exist, such as semi-supervised learning, where only some labels 
are present, and reinforcement learning, which learns from the feedback that results from action 
interaction, performs an action and receives feedback from this action. The former shares 
similarities with those discussed in the text above, and the latter has few current practical 
applications to draw on, so they are not discussed here. 
23 These separate collections of data are usually called Ôtest setsÕ or Ôvalidation setsÕ. 
24 TOM MITCHELL, MACHINE LEARNING (McGraw Hill, 1997). 
25 Accuracy alone is often not preferred, as a machine predicting rare events can get a high 
accuracy score simply by always predicting the event will not happen. One of the more common 
metrics in practice is AUC (area-under-curve), which signals a balance between avoiding false 
positives and false negatives. A variety of similar Ôloss functionsÕ exist, designed to measure 
performance in different ways and optimise on different grounds. 
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ability to automate difficult or nuanced tasks, such as search, machine vision 
and voice recognition.  As a result ML systems are fast becoming part of our 
critical societal infrastructure. Significantly, it would be impractical for many of 
these decisions to have a Òhuman in the loopÓ; this is truer still in complex 
ambient or ÒsmartÓ environments. 
 
ML uptake is also driven by business models and political goals, which have 
led practitioners to seek more Òdata-driven decisionsÓ. Cheap computation has 
produced large datasets, often as by-products of digitised service delivery and 
so accruing to the InternetÕs online intermediaries and industrial giants as well 
as traditional nation-states. There has been a visible near-evangelical 
compulsion to ÔmineÕ or infer insights from these datasets in the hope they might 
have social or economic value. New business models, particularly online, tend 
to offer services ostensibly for free, leaving monetisation to come from the 
relatively arbitrary data collected at scale along the way: a phenomenon some 
commentators refer to as Ôsurveillance capitalismÕ.26 These logics of 
ÒdataficationÓ have also lead to increasing uptake of ML in areas where the 
service offering does not necessarily require it, particularly in augmenting 
existing decisions with MLÐbased decision-support, in areas such as justice, 
policing, taxation or food safety. 
In this article, we are aware we are speaking across a wide range of very 
different ML systems, in scope, size, purpose and user, which may raise very 
different legal, ethical and societal issues; and this may lead to some misleading 
generalisations; however at this early stage of the research into ML and the 
GDPR, a wide scope seemed important, and where critical differences arise eg 
between private and public sector ML systems we have tried to make this plain. 
2.2! ML and society: issues of concern 
Aspects of ML systems have raised significant recent concern in the media, 
from civil society, academia, government and politicians. Here, we give a high 
level, non-exhaustive overview of the main sources of concern as we see them, 
in order to frame the social, technical and legal discussions that follow. 
2.2.1! Discrimination and unfairness 
A great deal of the extensive recent literature on algorithmic governance has 
wrestled with the problems of discrimination and fairness in ML27. Once it was 
commonly thought that machines could not display the biases of people and so 
would be ideal neutral decision makers.28 This had considerable influence on 
                                                      
26 Shoshana Zuboff, Big other: Surveillance capitalism and the prospects of an information 
civilization, 30 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 1, 75-89 (2015). 
27 See the useful survey in Brent Mittelstadt et al., The ethics of algorithms: Mapping the 
debate, 3 BIG DATA & SOCIETY 2 (2017), especially at section 7. 
28 See Christian Sandvig, Seeing the sort: The aesthetic and industrial defence of Òthe 
algorithmÓ, 11 MEDIA-N 1 (2015). 
11 | Edwards and Veale [draft, July 3 2017] | Slave to the algorithm? 
some early legal cases involving Google and other online intermediaries and 
their responsibility (or not) for algorithmic harms29. The drafting process of the 
1995 European DPD explicitly recognised this Ñ the European Commission 
noted in 1992 that 
Òthe result produced by the machine, using more and more sophisticated 
software, and even expert systems, has an apparently objective and 
incontrovertible character to which a human decision-maker may attach too 
much weight, thus abdicating his own responsibilities.Ó30 
As Mittelstadt et al. put it, Òthis belief is unsustainableÓ31 given the volume 
of evidence which has emerged in the last decade, mainly in the US in relation 
to racial discrimination. If ML systems cannot be assumed to be fair and 
unbiased, then some form of Òopening up the black boxÓ to justify their decisions 
becomes almost inevitable. 
Some have argued that Ôbig dataÕ will eventually give us a complete picture 
of society.32 Even if this was true Ñ we will come to our reservations about this 
Ñ making decisions based on past data is often problematic, as the structures 
that existed in that data often contain correlations we do not wish to re-
entrench. These correlations frequently relate to Òprotected characteristicsÓ, a 
varying list of attributes about an individual such as so-called race, gender, 
pregnancy status, religion, sexuality and disability, which in many jurisdictions 
are not allowed to directly (and sometimes indirectly33) play a part in decision-
making processes34. Algorithmic systems trained on past biased data without 
careful consideration are inherently likely to recreate or even exacerbate 
discrimination seen in past decision-making. For example, a CV filtering system 
based only on past success rates for job applicants will likely encode and 
replicate some of the biases exhibited by those filtering CVs or awarding 
positions manually in the past. While some worry that these systems will 
formalise explicit bias of the developers, the larger concern appears to be that 
                                                      
29 See this ÒneutralityÓ syndrome imported by analogy with common carrier status for 
online intermediaries and usefully traced by Uta Kohl, Google: the rise and rise of online 
intermediaries in the governance of the Internet and beyond (Part 2), 21 INT J LAW INFO TECH 2, 
187-234 (2013). 
30 Amended proposal for a Council Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, at 26, COM(92) 422 
final Ñ SYN 297 (Oct. 15, 1992). 
31 Mittelstadt et al., supra note 26, at 25. 
32 VIKTOR MAYER-SCHNBERGER AND KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL 
TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2013). 
33 In relation to the U.K., see Equality Act 2010, c. 15, s. 19; for discussion of US law, cf. 
Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst ÒBig DataÕs Disparate ImpactÓ (2016) 104 CALIFORNIA LAW 
REVIEW 671. 
34 For a central US discussion of this topic in the context of ML discrimination, see Barocas 
and Selbst, id. 
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these systems will be indirectly, unintentionally and unknowingly 
discriminatory.35 
A troubling issue here is what Gandy calls Òrational discriminationÓ.36 In 
many cases, protected characteristics like race might indeed statistically 
correlate with outcome variables of interest, such as propensity to be convicted 
of property theft, submit a fraudulent tax or welfare claim, follow an advert for 
a pay-day loan, or fail to achieve seniority in certain jobs. While these 
correlations may be ÒtrueÓ in the sense of statistical validity, we societally and 
politically often wish they werenÕt. ML systems are designed to discriminate Ñ 
that is, to discern Ñ but some forms of discrimination seem socially 
unacceptable. The use of gender Ñ and its recent prohibition Ñ in the pricing 
of car insurance in the EU serves as a recent salient example.37 One way forward 
is to try to build fair or non-discriminatory ML systems where these 
characteristics are not explicitly fed into the system, even if they have some 
predictive value Ñ e.g. by omitting the data column containing race or gender. 
However, this may still not result in a fair system as these excluded variables 
are likely related to some of the variables that are included, e.g. transaction 
data, occupation data, or postcode. Put simply, if the sensitive variable might be 
predictively useful, and we suspect the remaining variables might contain 
signals that allow us to predict the variable we omitted, then unwanted 
discrimination can sneak back in. In rare occasions, this happens explicitly. A 
ProPublica investigation uncovered the apparent use of Òethnic affinityÓ, a 
category constructed from user behaviour rather than explicitly asked of the 
user, as a proxy for race (which had been deliberately excluded as illegal to ask) 
for advertisers seeking to target audiences on Facebook to use.38 
More broadly, cases around ÔredliningÕ on the internet Ñ ÒwebliningÓ, as it 
was known nearly 20 years ago39 Ñ are far from new. A spate of stories in 2000 
                                                      
35 See Toon Calders and Indrė Žliobaitė, Why unbiased computational processes can lead to 
discriminative decision procedures, in DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (Bart 
Custers et al. eds., Springer, 2013); SARA HAJIAN, SIMULTANEOUS DISCRIMINATION PREVENTION AND 
PRIVACY PROTECTION IN DATA PUBLISHING AND MINING. (PhD Thesis, Universitat Rovira I Virgili, 2013) 
(on file with ProQuest). 
36 See OSCAR H GANDY JR, COMING TO TERMS WITH CHANCE: ENGAGING RATIONAL DISCRIMINATION 
AND CUMULATIVE DISADVANTAGE (Routledge, 2009). 
37 See Case C-236/09, Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v 
Conseil des ministres, 2011 E.C.R. I-00773. 
38 See Julia Angwin and Terry Parris Jr., Facebook Lets Advertisers Exclude Users by Race, 
PROPUBLICA, (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-lets-advertisers-
exclude-users-by-race. ProPublica subsequently reported in an update to the above article (Feb. 
8, 2017) that Facebook had amended their advert dashboard system so that it Òwill prevent 
advertisers from using racial categories in ads for housing, employment and creditÓ. The system 
will also warn advertisers to comply with the law in other categories. 
39 Marcia Stepanek, Weblining: Companies are using your personal data to limit your choices 
Ñ and force you to pay more for products, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK. (Apr. 3, 2000), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20170516143710/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/20
00-04-02/weblining. 
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during the heady years of the dot-com bubble surrounded racist profiling using 
personal data on the internet: in July 2000 consumer bank Wells Fargo had a 
lawsuit filed against it for using an online home-search system to steer 
individuals away from particular districts based on provided racial 
classifications40, whilst in April 2000 the online 1-hour-media-delivery service 
Kozmo received a lawsuit for denying delivery to residents in black 
neighbourhoods in Washington, DC41, which they defended in the media by 
saying that they were not targeting neighbourhoods based on race, but based 
on high Internet usage.42 
It is worth noting that in the EU, there have been far fewer scare revelations 
of Òracially biasedÓ algorithms than in the US. While some of this may be 
attributed to a less investigative journalistic, civil society or security research 
community, or conceivably, a slower route towards automation of state 
functions, it may also simply reflect a less starkly institutionally racist mass of 
training data.43 Racism is surely problematic around the world, yet does not 
manifest in statistically identical ways everywhere. Countries with deeper or 
clearer racial cleavages are naturally going to collect deeper or more clearly 
racist datasets, yet this does not mean that more nuanced issues of racism, 
particularly in interaction with other variables, does not exist. For example, the 
government of New Zealand commissioned many documents around the issue 
of the impact of an (eventually shelved) ML-driven child abuse anticipation 
system on Māori community, focussing especially on cultural sensitivity and its 
effect on whānau, the Māori concept of extended family.44 
Not all problematic correlations that arise in an ML system relate to 
characteristics protected by law. This takes us to the issue of unfairness rather 
than simply discrimination. As an example, is it fair to judge an individualÕs 
                                                      
40 Wells Fargo yanks "Community Calculator" service after ACORN lawsuit, CREDIT UNION TIMES 
(July 19 2000), http://www.cutimes.com/2000/07/19/wells-fargo-yanks-community-
calculator-service-after-acorn-lawsuit?slreturn=1494945213 [https://perma.cc/XG79-9P74]. 
41 Elliot Zaret and Brock N Meeks, KozmoÕs digital dividing lines, MSNBC (Apr. 11, 2000), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20001217050000/www.msnbc.com/news/373212.asp?cp1=1  
42 Kate Marquess, Redline may be going online, 86 ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 2000) at 81 (on file 
with EBSCOhost.com). Note that while these systems might not be Ômachine learningÕ as it is 
known today, it is likely to be powered by technologies such as linear or logistic regression, 
which in computer science, is seen as machine learning. 
43 Note the recent report of the ICO (supra note 4) which pays serious attention to issue of 
fairness and bias but cites only US examples of such despite being a product of the UK regulator. 
The German autocomplete cases (see Jones, infra note 81) Ñ are cited but referred to 
interestingly, as questions of error or accuracy, rather than discrimination or fairness). See also 
the Obama administration report on AI (supra note 4 at 30) specifying that Òit is important 
anyone using AI in the criminal justice system is aware of the limitations of the current dataÓ. 
44 See ANTON BLANK ET AL., ETHICAL ISSUES FOR MĀORI IN PREDICTIVE RISK MODELLING TO IDENTIFY 
NEW-BORN CHILDREN WHO ARE AT HIGH RISK OF FUTURE MALTREATMENT (Ministry of Social 
Development/Te Manatū Whakahiato Ora, 2015), https://www.msd.govt.nz/documents/about-
msd-and-our-work/publications-resources/research/predictive-modelling/00-ethical-issues-for-
maori-in-predictive-risk-modelling.pdf. 
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suitability for a job based on the web browser they use when applying, for 
example, even if it has been shown to be predictively useful?45 Potentially, there 
are grounds for claiming this is actually ÒtrueÓ discrimination: because the age 
of the browser may be a surrogate for other categories like poverty, since most 
such applications may be made in a public library. Indeed, is poverty itself a 
surrogate for a protected characteristic like race or disability? Unfair algorithms 
may upset individual subjects and reduce societal and commercial trust, but if 
legal remedies come into the picture then there is a worry of over extending 
regulatory control. Variables like web browser might, even if predictively 
important, be considered to abuse short-lived, arbitrary correlations, and in 
doing so, tangibly restrict individualsÕ autonomy. 
In the European DP regime, fairness is an overarching obligation when data 
is collected and processed46 something which is sometimes overshadowed by 
the focus on lawful grounds for prpocessing. The UK ICOÕs recent guidance on 
big data analytics seems to imply that ML systems are not unfair simply because 
they are ÒcreepyÓ or produce unexpected results47. However, they may be where 
they discriminate against people because they are part of a social group which 
is not one of the traditional discrimination categories; e.g. where a woman was 
locked out of the female changing room at the gym because she used the title 
ÒDrÓ, which the system associated with men only.48 The ICO report argues that 
unfairness may, on occasion, derive from expectations, where data is used for a 
reason apparently unconnected with the reason given for its collection;49 and 
from lack of transparency, which we discuss in detail below in section 2.2.3. One 
interesting factor is whether it is fair to discriminate against people on the basis 
of incorrect information they volunteer to attempt to protect their own privacy, 
such as disposable email addresses Ñ a well observed practice.50 
                                                      
45 How might your choice of browser affect your job prospects?, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 11, 
2013).  
46 GDPR, art 5(1)(a). 
47 ICO, supra note 4. 
48 ICO, supra note 4 at 20, referencing Jessica Fleig, Doctor locked out of women's changing 
room because gym automatically registered everyone with Dr title as male, THE MIRROR (Mar. 18, 
2015), http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/doctor-locked-out-womens-changing-5358594. 
This is one of the very few reports of algorithmic misbehaviour in the ICO report not emanating 
from the US, and from the original text it is not clear if the fault was algorithmic (the simplicity 
of the task means it is very unlikely to be ML based). 
49 This connects particularly to Helen NissenbaumÕs well known theory of contextual 
integrity. See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF 
SOCIAL LIFE (Stanford Law Books, 2009). In the EU data protection regime, in a perfect world, all 
purposes for which data is to be used, including re-uses, should be notified in the privacy policy 
or otherwise (GDPR art 5(1)(b)). However, as discussed below in section 6.1, this concept of 
Ònotice and choiceÓ is increasingly broken. 
50 ICO (supra note 4 at 26) citing evidence that 60% of UK consumers intentionally provide 
false data online. See Mindi Chahal, Consumers are ÔdirtyingÕ databases with false details, 
MARKETING WEEK, (Jul. 8 2015), https://www.marketingweek.com/2015/07/08/consumers-are-
dirtying-databases-with-false-details/. This is in fact increasingly recommended as a privacy-
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ÔRational discriminationÕ from ML mirroring society too perfectly is far from 
the only problem connecting algorithmic systems to fairness. A major problem 
arises from the subjective ways we collect training set data. We never have a 
complete picture in the data we collect. Most data are not gathered at random 
from society, but collected in ways that can be problematically skewed. For 
example, we cannot measure who breaks the law Ñ only who is convicted of it. 
Data collection in this area is far from impartial or neutral, instead linked 
heavily to broader issues such as access to justice, societal prejudices, and 
policing strategies. 
The fault here clearly lies primarily with the training and input data, and 
the lack of awareness and care taken in the process of transforming it into 
algorithmic models. One pundit stated that ÒAlgorithms discriminate. ItÕs not 
their fault, theyÕre strings of math, but people program themÓ.51 This statement 
is a little misleading, unless programming is seen to consist of the myriad social 
processes touching upon data collection, curation, cleaning, to model training 
and deployment in user interfaces or decision systems. 
A range of further issues compound this, which we will only cover briefly. 
The act of categorising people at all is subjective, political, and often 
distributive.52 While machine learning systems are often designed to classify 
people as outputs, individuals often need to be classified as inputs too Ñ into 
subjective demographics, for example. Where input variables to categorise 
people are manually engineered (a process known as feature engineering), it is 
almost always possible to do in many different ways. 
Reliance on past data additionally asks fairness questions that relate to the 
memory of algorithmic systems Ñ how far back is it appropriate to judge people 
on? Are individuals entitled to a tabula rasa after a certain number of years, as 
is common in some areas of criminal justice?53 There is a widely-held societal 
value to being able to Ômake a fresh startÕ, and technological change can create 
                                                      
protective practice: see, e.g. FINN BRUNTON AND HELEN NISSENBAUM, OBFUSCATION: A USERÕS GUIDE 
FOR PRIVACY AND PROTEST (MIT Press, 2015). 
51 Ethan Chiel, EU citizens might get a Ôright to explanationÕ about the decisions algorithms 
make, FUSION (May 7, 2016) http://fusion.kinja.com/eu-citizens-might-get-a-right-to-
explanation-about-the-1793859992. 
52 See GEOFFREY C BOWKER AND SUSAN LEIGH STARR, SORTING THINGS OUT: CLASSIFICATION AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES (MIT Press, 2000). 
53 Under the UK Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, as in many other European countries, 
disclosure of convictions (with some exceptions) is not required as these convictions become 
ÒspentÓ, in spheres such as employment, education, housing and other types of applications. 
Whether such convictions would be erased from training set data would not however necessarily 
follow, depending on who maintained the record, legal requirements and how training set data 
was cleaned. Notably official advice on spent convictions advises job applicants with spent 
convictions to check what is (still) known about them to employers via Google and also advises 
them of their Òright to be forgottenÓ, discussed at section 5.2.1), see Criminal Record Checks, 
NACRO, https://www.nacro.org.uk/resettlement-advice-service/support-for-
individuals/disclosing-criminal-records/criminal-record-checks/ [https://perma.cc/GKY4-
KHJA]. 
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new challenges to this. Other common institutional frameworks for 
forgetfulness can be found in bankruptcy law and in credit scoring.54 This 
observation is not new, and the role of computers in undermining the principle 
of Ôforgive-and-forgetÕ has been observed by a range of authors.55 
2.2.2! Informational privacy 
Privacy advocates and data subjects have long had concerns relating to 
profiling, which as a general notion, is a process whereby personal data about a 
class of data subjects is transformed into knowledge or ÒinferencesÓ about that 
group, which can then in turn be used to hypothesise about a personÕs likely 
attributes or behaviour. These might include the goods and services likely to 
interest them, the social connections they might have or wish to develop, 
medical conditions or personality traits. As the GDPR, art 4(4) now defines it, 
profiling is: 
Òany form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of 
personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, 
in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person's 
performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, 
interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements.Ó 
ML can build such profiles Ñ which are now often implicit and relational, 
rather than clear-cut categories Ñ but profiling is wider than ML, and many 
means of profiling common today remain grounded in manually defined 
classifications and distinctions which might even predate the digital era. As 
Hildebrandt notes, profiling is what all organisms do in relation to their 
environments, and is Òas old as life itselfÓ.56 
For data subjects, privacy concerns here embrace an enormous weight of 
issues about how data about them are collected to be bent into profiles; how 
they can control access to and processing of these data; and how they might 
control the dissemination and use of derived profiles. In particular, ML and big 
data analytics in general are fundamentally based around the idea of 
repurposing data, which is in principle contrary to the DP principle that data 
should be collected for named and specific purposes (GDPR, art 5(1)(b), 
Òpurpose limitationÓ). Data collected for selling books becomes repurposed as a 
                                                      
54 Jean-Franois Blanchette and Deborah G. Johnson, Data retention and the panoptic 
society: The social benefits of forgetfulness, 18 THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 1, 33Ð45 (2002); Tanne 
van Bree, Digital hyperthymesia Ñ on the consequences of living with perfect memory, in THE 
ART OF ETHICS IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (Liisa Janssens ed., Amsterdam University Press 2016). 
55 See ALAN F. WESTIN AND MICHAEL A. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY: COMPUTERS, RECORD-
KEEPING, AND PRIVACY (Quadrangle 1972); Gary T. Marx, The iron fist and the velvet glove: 
Totalitarian potential within democratic structures, in THE SOCIAL FABRIC: DIMENSIONS AND ISSUES 
135Ð161 (James E. Short Jr. ed., Sage 1972); in the legal community, this idea was popularised 
by VICTOR MAYER-SCHNBERGER, DELETE! THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE (Princeton 
University Press, 2009). We discuss the connected emergence of the "right to be forgotten" 
below in section 6.2.1. 
56 Hildebrandt, supra note 9. 
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system to sell adverts book buyers might like. Connected problems are that such 
Òbig dataÓ systems encourage limitless retention of data; and the collection of 
Òall the dataÓ rather than merely a statistically significant sample (contra 
principles in art 5(1)(e) and (c)). These are huge problems at the heart of 
contemporary DP law57, and we do not seek to review these fully here. We do 
however want to point out where these issues specifically affect ML. 
First, an exceedingly trite point is that data subjects increasingly perceive 
themselves as having little control over the collection of their personal data that 
go into profiles. As an example the most recent Eurobarometer survey on 
personal data from June 2015 (http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-
protection/news/240615_en.htm ) showed 30% of EU citizens as feeling they 
had no control over the data they provided online and a further 50% feeling 
they had only partial control. In the GDPR, collection falls under ÒprocessingÓ 
of data (art 4(2)) and is theoretically controlled by (inter alia) the need for a 
lawful ground of processing (art 6). Most lay people believe the only such 
ground is consent and thus consent defends their right to autonomous privacy 
management (though perhaps not in so many words). Yet consent is not the 
only lawful ground under art 6, and quite possibly, as much personal data is 
collected (at least in the private sector) on the grounds of the Òlegitimate 
interestsÓ of the controller, or on the grounds that the data was necessary to 
fulfil a contract entered into by the data subject.58 More importantly, consent 
has become debased currency given ever-longer standard term privacy policies, 
ÒnudgingÓ methods such as screen layout manipulation, and market network 
effects. It is often described using terms such as ÒmeaninglessÓ or ÒillusoryÓ.59 
Polls of European (and indeed US) data subjects tend to show around three-
quarters no longer feel they are fully in control of their personal data. 
                                                      
57 See discussion in ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY (hereafter ÒA29 WPÓ), OPINION 03/2013 ON 
PURPOSE LIMITATION, (Apr. 2, 2013) ICO, supra note 4 at 11-12; EDPS, supra note 4. 
58 GDPR, art 6. The public sector in effect has its own lawful ground for processing in the 
public interest. Policing and national security are exempted from the GDPR, although covered in 
a connected directive. See Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, 
detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the 
free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, 2016 
O.J. (L 119) 89. 
59 For a full discussion of the illusory nature of consent in the Internet world, see Lilian 
Edwards, Anti-Social networking: social networks, privacy, law and code, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERNET (Ian Brown ed., Edward Elgar, 2013); Rikke Frank Joergensen, 
The unbearable lightness of user consent, 3 INTERNET POLICY REVIEW 4 (2014), 
doi:10.14763/2014.4.330; Brendan Van Alsenoy et al., Privacy notices versus informational self-
determination: Minding the gap, 28 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW, COMPUTERS & TECHNOLOGY 2 
185-203 (2014), doi:10.1080/13600869.2013.812594. 
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The consent problem is aggravated by the rise of Òbastard dataÓ, a 
picturesque term coined by Joe McNamee.60 
"In a highly interconnected world of Òbig dataÓ É [d]ata are merged and 
compared. New data are generated and these, in turn can be compared with 
new data sets, with further new data being collected. Data have become fertile 
and have bastard offspring that create new challenges that go far beyond what 
society previously (and, unfortunately, still) considered to be ÒprivacyÓ." 
This is what profiling in ML systems does. Typically, data about people, 
which are personal, are transformed into data which have often been seen as 
non-personal and therefore fall outside the scope of DP law, perhaps simply 
because the data subject name or other obvious identifier has been removed.61 
Many businesses, particularly those operating online in social networking, 
advertising and search, have regularly argued that their profiles, however 
lucrative, merely involve the processing of anonymised data and hence do not 
fall within the scope of DP control. In recent times, the anonymity argument has 
been parried on grounds of potential for re-identification62. This has become 
especially crucial in the emerging ambient environment deriving from the 
Internet of Things (IoT), which collects data that on first glance looks mundane, 
but can be used with relative ease to discover granular, intimate insights. Data 
we would once have regarded as obviously non-personal such as raw data from 
home energy meters or location data from GPS devices is now, often through 
ML techniques, able to re-connected to individuals, and identities established 
from it.63 In practice, this has meant that the day-to-day actions that individuals 
                                                      
60 Joe McNamee, Is Privacy Still Relevant in a World of Bastard data?, EDRI EDITORIAL, (Mar. 
9, 2016), https://edri.org/enditorial-is-privacy-still-relevant-in-a-world-of-bastard-data. 
61 ÒPersonal dataÓ is defined at art 4(1) of the GDPR as Òany information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person (Ôdata subjectÕ); an identifiable natural person is one 
who can be identified, directly or indirectlyÓ. Note also the debate over ÒpseudonymousÓ data 
during the passage of the GDPR, which is defined as data processed Òin such a manner that the 
personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional 
information.Ó (art 2(5)). After some debate, the final text recognises explicitly that such data is 
personal data, although it garners certain privileges designed to incentivise pseudonymisation, 
e.g. it is a form of Òprivacy by designÓ (art 25), and is excluded from mandatory security breach 
notification. 
62 See the seminal text of Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the 
Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1701 (2010). In Europe, see A 29 WP, 
OPINION 05/2014 ON ANONYMISATION TECHNIQUES (2014). 
63 On reidentifiability of smart meter data, see Marek Jawurek et al., Smart metering de-
pseudonymization, ACSAC Õ11, 227Ð36 (2011) and Valentin Tudor et al., A study on data de-
pseudonymization in the smart grid, PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH EUROPEAN WORKSHOP ON SYSTEM 
SECURITY, ACM (2015); on general reidentifiability from mundane data such as location or credit 
card transactions, see Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the crowd: The privacy 
bounds of human mobility, 3 SCIENTIFIC REPORTS (2013), doi:10.1038/srep01376 and Yves-
Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the shopping mall: On the reidentifiability of credit card 
metadata, 347 SCIENCE 6221 (2015), doi:10.1126/science.1256297. 
19 | Edwards and Veale [draft, July 3 2017] | Slave to the algorithm? 
undertake, especially in ÒsmartÓ environments64, leave trails of potentially 
sensitive latent personal data in the hands of controllers who may be difficult to 
identify.65 If controllers are not identifiable, data subjects may not be able to 
effectively exercise the DP rights we discuss in sections 3 and 6 below even if 
they overcome the personal data and consent hurdles. 
Profiles assembled via ML or other techniques may be seen as ÒbelongingÓ 
to a group rather than an individual data subject. A profile does not simply 
identify the characteristics of individual data subjects; rather they are 
constructed by contrast with the other data subjects in the dataset. In a system 
attempting to target people by their entertainment choices, I am not simply 
someone who likes music festivals, but someone who is modelled as 75% more 
likely (give or take a margin of statistical uncertainty) to attend a music festival 
than the rest of my cohort. ÒPersistent knowledgeÓ over time links me into this 
class of interest to the platform that holds the data. Mittelstadt argues that big 
data analytics allow this new type of Òalgorithmically assembledÓ group to be 
formed whose information has no clear protection in DP law and possibly not 
in equality law.66 
This idea of Ògroup privacyÓ was an early, albeit marginalised, concern in 
DP, referred to as Òcategorical privacyÓ by some authors in the late 90s67, and 
sometimes conflated with discussions of what is personal data. As Hildebrandt 
stated in an early 2008 paper, Òdata have a legal status. They are protected, at 
least personal data areÉ [p]rofiles have no clear legal statusÓ.68 Hildebrandt 
argues that protection of profiles is very limited, as even if we argue that a 
profile becomes personal data when applied to an individual person to produce 
an effect, this fails to offer protection to (or, importantly, control over) the 
relevant group profile. A decade later, the GDPR refines this argument by 
asserting that if a profile can be used to target or Òsingle me outÓ69 Ñ for 
example, to deny me access to luxury services or to discriminate about what 
price I can buy goods at Ñ then the profile is my personal data as it relates to 
                                                      
64 See further MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, SMART TECHNOLOGIES AND THE END(S) OF LAW: NOVEL 
ENTANGLEMENTS OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY (Edward Elgar, 2015); Lilian Edwards, Privacy, Security 
and Data Protection in Smart Cities: A Critical EU Law Perspective, 1 EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION 
LAW REVIEW 28-58 (2016).  
65 On the practical difficulties for data subjects to identify data controllers, see Max Van 
Kleek et al., Better the Devil You Know: Exposing the Data Sharing Practices of Smartphone Apps, 
in CHIÕ17 (2017), doi:10.1145/3025453.3025556. 
66 Brent Mittelstadt, From Individual to Group Privacy in Big Data Analytics, __ PHILOS. 
TECHNOL. __ (forthcoming), doi:10.1007/s13347-017-0253-7. See also Anton Vedder, KDD: the 
challenge to individualism, 1 ETHICS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 4, 275 (1999); Alessandro 
Mantelero, From group privacy to collective privacy: towards a new dimension of privacy and data 
protection in the big data era, IN GROUP PRIVACY: NEW CHALLENGES OF DATA TECHNOLOGIES (Linnet 
Taylor et al. (eds.), Springer, 2017). 
67 Vedder, supra note 62. 
68 Hildebrandt, supra note 53. 
69 See GDPR, recital 26. 
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me and makes me identifiable.70 This approach however remains emergent and 
will be applied with hesitation even in some parts of Europe, given it is founded 
on a recital not a main text article.71 
A final key issue is the ability of such systems to transform data categorised 
as ÒordinaryÓ personal data at the time of collection into data perceived as 
especially sensitive. In European DP law, ÒspecialÓ categories of data (known as 
"sensitive personal data" in the UK) receive special protection. These are defined 
as restricted to personal data relating to race, political opinions, health and sex 
life, religious and other beliefs, trade union membership and (added by the 
GDPR for some purposes) biometric and genetic data.72 As already noted, in 
other areas of law, such as equality or employment law, subtly different 
ÒprotectedÓ characteristics may appear. In US privacy law, no general concept 
of sensitive data as such applies but it does have specific and highly regulated 
statutory privacy regimes for health, financial and childrenÕs data.73 Sensitivity 
itself is thus a legally and culturally constructed concept. 
A relevant and well-publicised Òwar storyÓ is the 2012 story of how the 
American supermarket Target profiled its customers to find out which were 
likely to be pregnant, so that relevant offers could then be targeted at them. As 
a result, according to urban myth, a teenage daughter was targeted with 
pregnancy related offers before her father with whom she lived knew about her 
condition.74 In DP law, if consent is used as the lawful ground for processing of 
special categories of data, that consent must be ÒexplicitÓ.75 If ordinary data 
                                                      
70 This discussion is important as whether a profile is seen as the personal data of a person 
also determines if they have rights to erase it or to port it to a different system or data 
controller. See discussion at sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2. 
71 GDPR recital 26. See discussion of the status of recitals below, in addition to Klimas and 
Vaicuikaite, infra note 131. This approach to personal data has however been championed by 
the A29 WP for many years: see, e.g., ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, OPINION 4/2007 ON THE CONCEPT 
OF PERSONAL DATA 01248/07/EN WP 136, at 13. 
72 GDPR, art 9 and see Case C-101/01, Bodil Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. 1-12971. 
73 See HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996); SarbanesÐ
Oxley Act of 2002 (also known as the "Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection Act"); and COPPA (Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998) . 
74 Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out A Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Father Did, 
FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target-
figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/. 
75 In an analogue world, this was a significant safeguard, as it meant that consent would 
often be taken with especial care, such as in written form. In an online world, where consent is 
most typically taken by reference to largely unread and ignored privacy policies, this is of 
limited protection, though it may push controllers towards more consumer-friendly methods of 
consent collection such as opt-in rather than opt-out.  
75 GDPR, art 9(2)(a). Other grounds are available but what is noticeable for commercial 
data controllers is that processing cannot be justified on the basis that it was necessary for the 
Òlegitimate interestsÓ of the controller, nor because it was necessary for the performance of a 
contract between data subject and controller Ð these are probably the two prevalent grounds for 
processing used in the commercial world. For executive and judicial processing of special 
categories of data (excluding policing which is excluded from the GDPR), the main grounds are 
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about purchases are collected and algorithmically transformed into insights that 
are sensitive, such as those related to health, or ÒprotectedÓ, such as those 
relating to pregnancy, what is the correct standard of safeguard? For additional 
complication, the GDPR lays down a basic rule that profiling Òshall not be basedÓ 
on the special categories of personal data, unless there is explicit consent.76 Does 
this apply to ML systems where the inputs are non-sensitive but the output 
inferences may be, as was the case in the Target profiling? These concerns are 
not just about race. Should explicit consent to profiling be given where, say, 
personal data is legitimately gathered from public social media posts using the 
Òlegitimate groundsÓ ground of processing77 and transformed into data about 
political preferences which is ÒsensitiveÓ data in the GDPR (art 9(1))?78 What 
about when ordinary data (e.g. number of miles walked per day) collected via 
a wearable like a Fitbit is transformed into health data used to reassess 
insurance premiums?79 
2.2.3! Opacity and transparency 
Users have long been disturbed at the idea that machines might make 
decisions for them, which they could not understand or countermand ; a vision 
                                                      
art 9(2)(c) (emergency health situations), (f) (regarding legal claims or defences or judicial 
action)and (g) (substantial public interest). 
76 GDPR, art 22(4). It is also not clear if a controller can simply request a blanket consent to 
profiling of sensitive personal data in a privacy policy Ð which would tend to make this 
provision nugatory - or if something more tailored is needed. It is interesting that a recent 
collective statement of a number of EU Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) (see Common 
Statement by the Contact Group of the Data Protection Authorities of The Netherlands, France, 
Spain, Hamburg and Belgium, CNIL (May 16, 2017), https://www.cnil.fr/fr/node/23602) 
announcing a number of privacy breaches by Facebook, one issue is that company Òuses 
sensitive personal data from users without their explicit consent. For example, data relating to 
sexual preferences were used to show targeted advertisementsÓ. (noted specifically by the 
Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens, the DPA of the Netherlands). It is not said if that data was created 
algorithmically or existed as a user input. 
77 GDPR, art 6 (1)(f). Note that these interests may be overridden by the Òinterests or 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subjectÓ and that this ground is not available for 
special categories of data under art 9 (see supra note 75). 
78 This is quite likely part of the data collection and processing to produce political targeted 
advertisements pushed out via Facebook, which is allegedly undertaken in the UK and 
elsewhere by companies under recent scrutiny such as like Cambridge Analytica. This whole 
area is currently highly sensitive, given concerns about recent elections and referenda, and is 
under investigation by the UKÕs ICO: see Watchdog to launch inquiry into misuse of data in 
politics, The GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/04/cambridge-analytics-data-brexit-
trump. Interestingly, the article itself is currently the subject of legal dispute as of mid-May 
2017! 
79 This of course raises the issue of what we define as Òhealth dataÓ, which the CJEU has not 
yet decided on. Similar issues have risen in US in relation to the scope of HIPPA (supra note 
73). In an interesting example of Òcounter-profilingÓ obfuscation, see the case of ÒUnfit BitsÓ 
described in Olga Khazan, How to Fake Your Workout, THE ATLANTIC, (Sep. 28, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/09/unfit-bits/407644/  
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of out of control authority which derives from earlier notions of unfathomable 
bureaucracy found everywhere from Kafka to Terry GilliamÕs Brazil. Such 
worries have emerged from the quotidian world (credit scoring, job 
applications, speeding camera tickets) as well as the emergent, fictional worlds 
of technology (wrongful arrest by Robocop, 2001's HAL, automated nuclear 
weapons launched by accident in Wargames). 
In Europe, one of the earliest routes to taming pre-ML automated processing 
was the creation of Òsubject access rightsÓ (SARs) empowering a user to find out 
what data was held about them by a company or government department, 
together with a right to rectify oneÕs personal data Ñ to set the record straight. 
These rights, harmonised across Europe in the DPD, art 12, included the right 
to rectify, erase or block data the processing of which did not comply with the 
Directive Ñ in particular where they were incomplete or inaccurate. These 
rights were, as we shall discuss below, fused and extended into the so-called 
Òright to be forgottenÓ in the GDPR, which succeeded the DPD in 2016. As Citron 
and Pasquale have mapped, although the US lacked an omnibus notion of DP 
laws, similar rights emerged in relation to credit scoring in the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act 1970.80 
Domains such as credit scoring, public or rented housing applications and 
employment applications have entrenched in the public mind the intuition that 
challenging a decision, and possibly seeking redress, involves a preceding right 
to an explanation of how the decision was reached. This lead in Europe to a 
specific though rather under-used right in the DPD (art 15) to stop a decision 
being made solely on the basis of automated processing.81 Data subjects had a 
right to obtain human intervention (a Òhuman in the loopÓ), in order to express 
their point of view but this right did not, notably, contain an express right to an 
explanation.82 This right was updated in the GDPR to extend to a more general 
concept of profiling83 as discussed above. As Citron and Pasquale84 map in detail, 
credit scoring has been a canonical domain for these issues in the US as well, as 
it has evolved from ÔcomplicatedÕ but comprehensible rule based approaches 
embodying human expertise, to ÔcomplexÕ and opaque systems often accused of 
                                                      
80 See Danielle Keats Citron and Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for 
Automated Predictions, 89 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 1 (2014). 
81 This is interestingly interpreted by Jones to imply that European systems are more 
interested in the human dignity of data subjects than the US system: see Meg Leta (Ambrose) 
Jones, Right to a Human in the Loop: Political Constructions of Computer Automation & 
Personhood from Data Banks to Algorithms, 47 SOCIAL STUDIES OF SCIENCE 216 (2017).  
82 But see the information rights in art 12(a) DPD which became art 15(h) in the GDPR: 
discussed in section 3.2.  
83 GDPR, art 4 (4). ÒProfilingÓ includes Òany form of automated processing of PD consisting 
of the use of PD to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person in particular to 
analyse or predict [...] Performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, 
interests, reliability or behaviour, location or movementsÓ. Note such profiling may be achieved 
other than by ML; see discussion in section 2.2.1. 
84 Citron and Pasquale, supra note 80. 
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arbitrary or unfair decisions. As such this domain foreshadows the difficulties 
routinely encountered now in trying to interpret many modern ML systems. 
Explanation rights of a sort are common in the public sphere in the form of 
freedom of information (FOI) rights against public and governmental 
institutions. Transparency is seen as one of the bastions of democracy, liberal 
government, accountability and restraint on arbitrary or self-interested exercise 
of power. As Brandeis famously said, Ò[s]unlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.Ó85 Transparency rights 
against public bodies enable an informed public debate, generate trust in and 
legitimacy for the government, as well as allow individual voters to vote with 
more information. These are perhaps primarily societal benefits, but citizens can 
clearly also benefit individually from getting explanations from public bodies 
via FOI: opposing bad planning or tender decisions, seeking information on why 
hospitals or schools were badly run leading to harm to one self or oneÕs child, 
and requiring details about public funding priorities are all obvious examples. 
By comparison with FOI, transparency rights are less clearly part of the 
apparatus of accountability of private decision-making. As Zarsky says, Òthe 
ÒdefaultÓ of governmental action should be transparencyÓ.86 The opposite is 
more or less true of private action, where secrecy, including commercial or trade 
secrecy (and autonomy of business practices87) and protection of IP rights, are 
de facto the norm. DP law in fact seems quite odd when looked at from outside 
the informational privacy ghetto, as it is one of the few bodies of law that applies 
a general principle of transparency88 even-handedly to private and public sector 
controllers, with more exceptions for the latter than the former in terms of 
policing89 and national security.90 But disclosure of personal data to its subject, 
from both public and private data controllers, is of course justified at root in 
                                                      
85 LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLEÕS MONEY, AND HOW BANKERS USE IT (National Home Library 
Foundation, 1933) at 62. 
86 Tal Zarsky, Transparency in Data Mining: From Theory to Practice, in DISCRIMINATION AND 
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (Bart Custers et al. eds., Springer, 2013), at 301-324. 
87 Note that in the EU freedom to conduct a business is a fundamental right (art 14, Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFEU) 2012/C 326/02). 
88 GDPR, art 5(1)(a). 
89 See now GDPR art 2(2)(d) but note the new policing data protection directive adopted 
alongside the GDPR, supra note 58. 
90 Arguably despite these exceptions, European countries have traditionally been more 
transparent than the US in the development of ML systems used for judicial or penal decision 
support. It is not uncommon to find ML systems in Europe developed in-house, rather than 
privately procured and subject to proprietary secrecy. Indeed, risk scoring based on ML has been 
used in the UK and the Dutch justice system for several years (the Offender Assessment System 
(OASys) in the former and Statisch Recidiverisico (StatRec) in the latter), and both 
governments have historically published both model weights and detailed analysis of different 
aspects of their performance Ñ for example in the way that predictive validity differs by race, 
age or gender. See A COMPENDIUM OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS ON THE OFFENDER ASSESSMENT SYSTEM 
(OASYS) (Robin Moore ed., Ministry of Justice Analytical Series, 2015); Nikolaj Tollenaar et al., 
StatRec Ñ Performance, Validation and Preservability of a Static Risk Prediction Instrument, 129 
BULLETIN OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY/BULLETIN DE MTHODOLOGIE SOCIOLOGIQUE 25 (2016). 
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Europe by the fundamental nature of privacy as a human right, sometimes 
extended to a separate right to DP.91 
Yet an explanation, or some kind of lesser transparency, is of course often 
essential to mount a challenge against a private person or commercial business 
whether in court or to a regulatory body like a privacy commissioner, 
ombudsman, trading standards body or complaints association. On a societal 
level, harmful or anti-competitive market practices cannot be influenced or shut 
down without powers of disclosure. The most obvious example of transparency 
rights in the private92 sphere outside DP, and across globally disparate legal 
systems, lies in financial disclosure laws in the equity markets; however 
arguably these are designed to protect institutional capitalism by retaining trust 
in a functioning market rather than protecting individual investors, or less still, 
those globally affected by the movements of markets. Disclosure is also 
reasonably common in the private sector as a Ònaming and shamingÓ 
mechanism93 Ñ e.g. the introduction in the GDPR of mandatory security breach 
notification94, or the US EPA Toxics Release Inventory.95 Disclosures may also 
be made voluntarily to engage public trust as in programmes for visible 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), and standards for this exist with bodies 
such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). 
Despite the sometimes almost unthinking association of transparency and 
accountability, the two are not synonymous.96 Accountability is a contested 
concept, but in essence involves a party being held to account having to justify 
their actions, field questions from others, and face appropriate consequences.97 
Transparency is only the beginning of this process. It is interesting that in the 
context of open datasets as a successor to FOI, there is considerable evidence 
that disclosure (voluntary or mandated) of apparently greater quantities of 
government data does not necessarily equal more effective scrutiny or better 
                                                      
91 ECHR, art 8; CFEU arts 7 and 8. 
92 An ancillary question which cannot be pursued here surrounds how many of the 
functions of the state are now carried out by private bodies or public-private partnerships, and 
what the resulting susceptibility to FOI requests (or other public law remedies, such as judicial 
review) should be. 
93 Zarsky, supra note 86, at 311. 
94 GDPR, arts 33-34. 
95 Madhu Khanna et al., Toxics release information: A policy tool for environmental 
protection, (1998) 36 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT 3, 243-66; Archon 
Fung and Dara O'Rourke, Reinventing environmental regulation from the grassroots up: 
Explaining and expanding the success of the toxics release inventory, 25 ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT 2, 115Ð127 (2000), doi:10.1007/s002679910009. 
96 See for example PasqualeÕs rejection of the idea that transparency has created any real 
effects on or accountability of the financial sector, especially after the financial crash and 
recession of the last decade. See FinanceÕs Algorithms: The EmperorÕs New Codes, in Pasquale, 
supra note 3. 
97 Mark Bovens, Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework, 13 
EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 4, 447Ð468 (2007), doi:10.1111/j.1468-0386.2007.00378.x. 
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governance.98 O'Neill calls this a Òheavily one-sided conversationÓ with 
governments able to minimise the impact of disclosures by timing of release, 
difficulty of citizens in understanding or utilising the data, failures to update 
repositories and resource agencies who use and scrutinise open data, and 
general political obfuscation.99 Heald terms this a "transparency illusion" which 
may generate no positive results while possibly creating negative impacts, such 
as privacy breaches and loss of trust if disclosures of maladministration are not 
met with punishment.100 
Notwithstanding these doubts, and turning to ML systems, transparency 
rights remain intimately linked to the ideal of effective control of algorithmic 
decision-making. Zarsky argues that the individual adversely affected by a 
predictive process has the right to Òunderstand whyÓ and frames this in familiar 
terms of autonomy and respect as a human being; Hildebrandt has long called 
for Transparency Enhancing Tools to control the impacts of profiling.101 Similar 
ideas pervade the many calls for reinstating due process in algorithmic decision 
making102, for respecting the right to a Òhuman in the loopÓ as an aspect of 
human dignity103 and for introducing Òinformation accountabilityÓ in the form 
of Òpolicy awarenessÓ which will Òmake bad acts visible to all concernedÓ; or 
varied similar ideas of Òalgorithmic accountability.Ó104 
Yet this connection has never really been justified in terms of practical 
efficacy in relation to the broad range of algorithmic decisions. If we return to 
the notion of algorithmic "war stories" that strike a public nerve, in many cases 
what the data subject wants is not an explanation Ñ but rather for the 
disclosure, decision or action simply not to have occurred. Consider, in relation 
to an individual, the Target pregnancy case mentioned in section 2.2.2 above, 
                                                      
98 See Helen Margetts, Transparency and Digital Government, in TRANSPARENCY: THE KEY TO 
BETTER GOVERNANCE?, 3-23 (Christopher Hood and David A. Heald eds., Oxford University Press, 
2006);  
99 Onora OÕNeill, Transparency and the Ethics of Communication, in Hood and Heald, supra 
note 98, at 75-90. 
100 David A. Heald, Transparency as an Instrumental Value, in Hood and Heald, supra note 
98, at 59-73. 
101 Zarsky, supra note 86, at 317; Hildebrandt, supra note 9, and in her subsequent work. 
102 See, e.g. Crawford and Schultz, supra note 12; Citron, supra note 14.  
103 See Jones, supra note 81. 
104 Daniel J. Weitzner et al., Information Accountability, 51 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 6 
(2008), https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/37600/MIT-CSAILTR2007-034.pdf; 
Maayan Perel (Filmar) and Nova Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright 
Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473 (2016); NICHOLAS DIAKOPOULOS, ALGORITHMIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORTING: ON THE INVESTIGATION OF BLACK BOXES (Tow Centre for Digital 
Journalism, 2013), http://towcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/78524_Tow-Center-
Report-WEB-1.pdf. For a rejection of rights of transparency as the answer to algorithmic 
accountability, see Joshua Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 
LAW REVIEW 633 (2017). 
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or another recent case of outrage affecting a group, when Google wrongly 
categorised some black people in its Photos app as gorillas.105 
In the few modern EU legal cases we have on controlling algorithmic 
governance, an explanation has not usually been the remedy sought. An 
interesting example is the seminal CJEU Google Spain106 case which introduced 
the Òright to be forgottenÓ and is one of the few cases of algorithmic harm to 
have come to the highest EU court. In this case, the claimant, Mr Costeja 
Gonzlez, asking Google to remove as top link in searches on his name, a link 
to an old and outdated page in a newspaper archive recording his long-repaid 
public debt. Mr Costeja GonzlezÕs (successful) ambition when he went to court 
was to remove the "inaccurate" data; he had, apparently, no interest in why 
GoogleÕs search algorithm continued to put long outdated results at the top of 
its rankings (even though arguably this was inexplicable in terms of how we 
think we know Page Rank works). A similar desire for an action, not for an 
explanation, can be seen in the various European Òautocomplete defamationÓ 
cases.107 
In all these cases, an explanation will not really relieve or redress the 
emotional or economic damage suffered; but it will allow developers not to 
make the same mistake again. Clearly these cases may not be typical. An 
explanation may surely help overturn the credit refusal issued by a machine, or 
an automated decision to wrongfully refuse bail to a black person or welfare to 
someone with medical symptoms Ñ and these are obviously important social 
redresses Ñ but it will not help in all cases. And even in these more mainstream 
cases, as Pasquale correctly identifies, transparency alone does not always 
produce either redress or public trust in the face of institutionalised power or 
money108, just as David Brin's Transparent Society does not in fact produce 
effective control of state surveillance when the power disparity between the 
state and the sousveillant is manifest.109 
Thus it is possible that in some cases transparency or explanation rights may 
be overrated or even irrelevant. This takes us to the question of what 
transparency in the context of algorithmic accountability actually means. Does 
it simply mean disclosure of source code including the model, and inputs and 
outputs of training set data? Kroll et al. argue that this is an obvious but nave 
solution, since transparency in source code is neither necessary to, not sufficient 
for algorithmic accountability, and it moreover may create harms of its own in 
terms of privacy disclosures and the creation of ÒgamingÓ strategies which can 
                                                      
105 See Google Photos labels black people as 'gorillas', THE TELEGRAPH (May 4, 2017), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/11710136/Google-Photos-assigns-gorilla-tag-
to-photos-of-black-people.html. 
106 Google Spain v Agencia Espaola de Proteccin de Datos (AEPD) and Gonzlez, Case 
C̻131/12, 13 May 2014. 
107 For further detail see Kohl, supra note 29; Jones, supra note 81. 
108 Pasquale, supra note 3, at 212. 
109 See Bruce Schneier, The Myth of the "Transparent Society, WIRED (Mar. 6, 2008). 
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subvert the algorithmÕs efficiency and fairness.110 Instead they point out that 
auditing, both in the real and the digital world can achieve accountability by 
looking at the external inputs and outputs of a decision process, rather than at 
the inner workings. Even in the justice system, it is common for courts to 
adjudicate based only on partial evidence, since even with discovery, evidence 
may be unavailable or excluded on grounds like age of witness, hearsay status 
or scientific dubiety. We often do not understand how things in the real world 
work: my car, the stock market, the process of domestic conveyancing. Instead 
of (or as well as) transparency, we often rely on expertise, or the certification 
of expertise (e.g., that my solicitor who does my house conveyancing, is vouched 
for both by her law degree and her Law Society affiliation, as well as her 
professional indemnity insurance if things go wrong (see further, section 6.2)). 
Transparency may at best be neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for 
accountability and at worst something that fobs off data subjects with a remedy 
of little practical use. 
We return to this question of Òtransparency fallacyÓ below at section 5.1, 
and to the question of what types of explanation in what circumstances may 
actually be useful, and to whom (section 4 ). First however we consider the 
recent legal debate on whether a Òright to an explanationÓ of algorithmic 
decisions does indeed exist in EU DP law. 
3! SEEKING A RIGHT TO AN EXPLANATION IN EUROPEAN DATA 
PROTECTION LAW 
In 2016, to the surprise of some EU DP lawyers, and to considerable global 
attention, Goodman and Flaxman111 asserted in a short paper that the GDPR 
contained a "right to an explanation" of algorithmic decision making. As 
Wachter et al. have comprehensively pointed out112, the truth is not quite that 
simple. In this section we consider the problems involved in extracting this right 
from the GDPR, an instrument still heavily built around a basic skeleton 
inherited from the 1995 DPD 113 and created by legislators who, while concerned 
about profiling in its obvious manifestations such as targeted advertising, had 
little information on the detailed issues of ML. Even if a right to an explanation 
can viably be teased out from the GDPR, we will show that the number of 
constraints placed on it by the text (which is itself often unclear) make this a far 
from ideal approach. 
                                                      
110 See Kroll et al., supra note 104. Further discussion of ÒgamingÓ is found at section 4.3.1.  
111 Goodman and Flaxman, supra note 6. 
112 Wachter et al., supra note 11. 
113 Itself based to some extent on preceding national laws as well as the Council of EuropeÕs 
work. For a history of data protection law, see GLORIA GONZALEZ FUSTER, THE EMERGENCE OF 
PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF THE EU (Springer, 2014). 
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3.1! GDPR, article 22: automated individual decision-making 
Our starting point is art 15 of the now-replaced DPD which was explicitly 
aimed at protecting users from unsupervised automated decision making. This 
rather odd little provision114 was mainly overlooked by lawyers and 
commentators to the point of non-significance and few saw the potential it had 
as applied to algorithmic opacity. It is clear that art 15 of the DPD did not 
contemplate dealing with the special opacity found in complex, ML systems, and 
very little was changed to manage this in the new GDPR, art 22 which provides: 
Òthe right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated 
processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects, concerning him or 
her, or significantly affects him or herÓ. [italics added] 
Importantly, art 22 like art 15 before it is a very delimited right. Crucially, 
the remedy it provides is primarily to prevent processing of a particular kind 
and secondly, to require that a Òhuman in the loopÓ be inserted on challenge. 
The remedy is not, prima facie, to any kind of explanation of how processing 
was carried out or result achieved, that being the province of the information 
rights of the data subject (see below).115 
Even after this there are a number of hurdles to get over. First, art 22 applies 
only when the processing has been solely by automated means. ML systems that 
affect peopleÕs lives significantly are usually not fully automated Ñ instead used 
as decision support116 Ñ and indeed in a great deal of these cases Ð for example 
involving victims of crimes or accidents - full automation seems inappropriate 
or far off. Art 22 would be excluded from many of the well-known algorithmic 
Òwar storiesÓ on this basis: for example the algorithmic decisions on criminal 
justice risk assessment reported by ProPublica in 2016.117 While the racial bias 
                                                      
114 Mendoza and Bygrave describe art 15 as "a second class data protection right: rarely 
enforced, poorly understood and easily circumvented", not included in other fair information 
privacy schemes such as the OECD guidelines nor demanded by safe harbour. See Izak Mendoza 
and Lee A. Bygrave, The Right Not to Be Subject to Automated Decisions Based on Profiling, in EU 
INTERNET LAW: REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT (Tatiani Synodinou et al. eds., Springer, 
forthcoming 2017). Their article draws on Bygrave's own early work in Lee A. Bygrave, Minding 
the machine: Article 15 of the EC data protection directive and automated profiling, 17 COMPUTER 
LAW & SECURITY REPORT, 17Ð24 (2001). See also Kobsa, supra note 9; Hildebrandt, supra note 9. 
115 Mendoza and Bygrave, supra note 114 at 13, argue it is implicit in art 22 and from 
articles 13-15 that there is a right to be informed that automated decision is being made. 
116 CABINET OFFICE, DATA SCIENCE ETHICAL FRAMEWORK (HM Government, May 2016), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/data-science-ethical-framework. Even where 
decisions can be taken autonomously by systems, the framework, specifically advises human 
oversight in non-trivial problems. 
117 See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA, (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing. 
Exactly because these systems might be used without enough human (judicial) supervision (or 
ability to supervise) they have been banned in the courts of some states such as Wisconsin: see 
Mitch Smith, In Wisconsin, a Backlash Against Using Data to Foretell DefendantÕs Futures, THE 
NEW YORK TIMES (Jun. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/23/us/backlash-in-
wisconsin-against-using-data-to-foretell-defendants-futures.html. 
29 | Edwards and Veale [draft, July 3 2017] | Slave to the algorithm? 
in these systems is clearly objectionable, the important point here is that these 
systems were always at least nominally advisory. 
When does ÒnominalÓ human involvement become no involvement? A 
number of European DP authorities are currently worrying at this point.118 
Human involvement can also be rendered nominal by Òautomation biasÓ, a 
psychological phenomenon where humans either over or under-rely on decision 
support systems.119 The Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy in early 
2016 specifically recommended that more attention be paid to Òsemi-automated 
decision-makingÓ in the GDPR, in relation to profiling.120 
Second, art 22 requires there to have been a ÒdecisionÓ which Òproduces legal 
effects, concerning him or her, or significantly affects him or herÓ. There is little 
clue what a ÒdecisionÓ is in art 22 beyond the brief statement of the GDPR that 
it Òmay include a measureÓ (recital 71). This takes us to two sub-issues. First, is 
a ÒdecisionÓ what a ML system actually produces? ML technologists would argue 
that the output of an algorithmic system is merely something which is then used 
to make a decision, either by another system, or by a human (such as a judge). 
When queried, ML models mostly output a classification or an estimation, 
generally with uncertainty estimates. On their own they are incapable of 
synthesising the estimation and relevant uncertainties into a decision for 
action.121 
Second, even if we posit that algorithmic ÒoutputÓ and human ÒdecisionÓ 
may be conflated in art 22 for purposive effect, when does an ML "decision" 
affect a specific individual? What if what the system does is classify subject X as 
75% more likely than the mean to be part of group A, and group A is correlated 
to an unwelcome characteristic B (poor creditworthiness, for example)? Is this 
a decision ÒaboutÓ X? It is interesting that in relation to a "legal" effect the 
                                                      
118 The UK ICO at the time of writing recently concluded consulting on this point: see ICO, 
FEEDBACK REQUEST Ð PROFILING AND AUTOMATED DECISION-MAKING [v 1.0 ,2017/04/06] (2017) at 20, 
https://ico.org.uk/media/2013894/ico-feedback-request-profiling-and-automated-decision-
making.pdf, where they ask: ÒDo you consider that ÒsolelyÓ in Article 22(1) excludes any human 
involvement whatsoever, or only actions by a human that influence or affect the outcome? What 
mechanisms do you have for human involvement and at what stage of the process?Ó. 
119 Linda J Skitka et al., Accountability and automation bias, 52 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF 
HUMAN-COMPUTER STUDIEs 4, 701-717 (2000); Kate Goddard et al., Automation bias: A systematic 
review of frequency, effect mediators, and mitigators, 19 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL 
INFORMATICS ASSOCIATION 1, 121Ð127 (2012). Literature that indicates we tend to over-rely on 
algorithms includes Jaap J. Dijkstra, User agreement with incorrect expert system advice, 18 
BEHAVIOUR & INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 6, 399Ð411 (1999), doi:10.1080/014492999118832. 
Those that think we do not include Mary T. Dzindolet et al., The role of trust in automation 
reliance. 58 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN-COMPUTER STUDIES 6, 697Ð718 (2003), 
doi:10.1016/S1071-5819(03)00038-7; Berkeley Dietvorst et al. Algorithm aversion: People 
erroneously avoid algorithms after seeing them err. 144 JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: 
GENERAL 1, 114 (2015), doi:10.1037/xge0000033 
120 WRR, supra note 4 at 142.  
121 HEATHER DOUGLAS, SCIENCE, POLICY AND THE VALUE-FREE IDEAL (University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 2009), We return to the issue of ÒdecisionsÓ and ML below. 
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decision must be "concerning him or her" but not in relation to a "significant" 
effect. In the paradigmatic domain of credit scoring, there seems no doubt to 
the ordinary person (or lawyer) that there is a decision (by the credit offering 
company) and that it affects an individual data subject (the person seeking 
credit). But in many cases using ML systems, as we see below, this is not so 
clear. 
3.1.1! Article 22 in the context of Ôalgorithmic war storiesÕ 
Consider two well-known and influential early examples of Ôalgorithms gone 
badÕ. In 2013122, Latanya Sweeney, a security researcher at Harvard University, 
investigated the delivery of targeted adverts by Google AdSense using a sample 
of racially associated names. She found statistically significant discrimination in 
advert delivery based on searches of 2,184 racially associated personal names 
across two websites. First names associated predictively with non-white racial 
origin (such as DeShawn, Darnell and Jermaine) generated a far higher 
percentage of adverts associated with or using the word ÒarrestÓ when compared 
to ads delivered to ÒwhiteÓ first names. On one of the two websites examined, a 
black-identifying name was 25% more likely to get an ad suggestive of an arrest 
record. Sweeney also ruled out knowledge of any criminal record of the person 
to whom the ad was delivered. Acknowledging that it was beyond the scope of 
her research to know what was happening in the Òinner workings of Google 
AdSenseÓ123, and whether the apparent bias displayed was the fault of society, 
Google or the advertiser, Sweeney still asserted her research raised questions 
about societyÕs relationship to racism and the role of online advertising services 
in this context. 
In an even earlier incident of notoriety in 2004, the Google search 
algorithm(s) placed a site ÒJew WatchÓ at the top of the rankings for many 
people who searched on the word ÒJewÓ. Google (in stark contrast to its more 
recent attitudes124) refused to manually alter their ratings and claimed instead 
                                                      
122 Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, 56 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 
5, 44-54 (2013). 
123 For example, Sweeney raises the following possibilities: did the advertiser provide 
multiple templates which themselves ÒtargetedÓ a list of black sounding names? Did GoogleÕs 
algorithm adjust as it received hits to serve the ads to people with black-associated names more 
frequently? Did people with black-identifying names click on the ÒarrestÓ related ads more 
often? In each scenario, the combinatorial Òapproach aligns the financial  
Interests of Google, as the ad deliverer, with the advertiserÓ. 
124 Google has rethought its approach to such cases, especially after unfavourable press 
reports, especially a 2016 Observer investigation: see Samuel Gibbs, Google alters search 
autocomplete to remove 'are Jews evil' suggestion, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/05/google-alters-search-autocomplete-
remove-are-jews-evil-suggestion. Interestingly it seems GoogleÕs preferred approach is to add 
Òquality ratingÓ to pages to downgrade them in their search algorithms rather than removing 
links per se: this is interesting considering the issues raised later over how it might be possible to 
alter ML models using the art 17 Òright to be forgottenÓ Ñ see Google launches new effort to flag 
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that the preferences of a particular group of searchers had put Jew Watch to the 
top rather than any normative ranking by Google. It was stated that Ò[B]ecause 
the word ÒJewÓ is often used in an anti-Semitic context, this had caused GoogleÕs 
automated ranking system to rank Jew Watch Ñ apparently an anti-Semitic web 
site Ñ number one for the query.Ó125 In the end Google refused to remove the 
site from the rankings but collective effort was encouraged among users to push 
up the rankings of other non-offensive sites, and eventually, the site itself 
disappeared from the Internet. 
In each of these cases, did a relevant, ÒlegalÓ, or ÒsignificantÓ, decision take 
place affecting a person Ñ or only a group? Here we have some rare examples 
of a system apparently making a ÒdecisionÓ solely by automated processing, so 
the first hurdle is surmounted, but is the second? In the Google AdSense example, 
was a ÒdecisionÓ taken with particular reference to Sweeney? Clearly there was 
no effect on her legal status (which implies changes to public law status such as 
being classified as a US citizen, or private law effects such as having capacity to 
make a will126) but did the delivery of the advert significantly affect her as an 
individual? The most obvious takeaway is that a racial group was affected by an 
assumption of above average criminality, and she was part of that group, which 
although a familiar formulation in discrimination laws, takes us to somewhere 
very different from the individual subject-focused rights usually granted by DP 
and the GDPR. 
Even if we accept an impact on Sweeney as an individual constructed 
through group membership, was it ÒsignificantÓ? She did after all merely have 
sight of an advert which she was not compelled to click on, and which could 
even have been hidden using an ad blocker. Mendoza and Bygrave127 express 
doubts that targeted advertising will ÒordinarilyÓ generate significant 
consequences (though it might if aimed at a child) and point to the two 
examples given by recital 71 of automated credit scoring and e-recruitment. Was 
she significantly affected by pervasive racism as exemplified by the advert 
delivery? This sounds more important to be sure but surely responsibility should 
lie with the society that created the racist implications rather than the ÒdecisionÓ 
taken by Google AdSense, or Google alongside the advertiser? Is it relevant that 
almost certainly no human at Google could have known Sweeney would be sent 
                                                      
upsetting or offensive content in search, SEARCHENGINE WATCH (Mar. 14, 2017), 
http://searchengineland.com/google-flag-upsetting-offensive-content-271119. 
125 See Google in Controversy over Top-Ranking for Anti-Jewish Site, SEARCHENGINE WATCH 
(Apr. 24, 2004), https://searchenginewatch.com/sew/news/2065217/google-in-controversy-
over-top-ranking-for-anti-jewish-site.  
126 See discussion in Mendoza and Bygrave, supra note 114 at 10, who suggest a decision 
must have a Òbinding effectÓ. It is hard to see how an advert could have that. On the other hand, 
art 22 clearly applies to ÒprofilingÓ which as we have seen (see supra note 83) includes in its 
definition in art 4(4) the evaluation of Òpersonal aspectsÓ of a person including their Òpersonal 
preferences.Ó This sounds a lot like targeted advertising, though see below on whether that 
decision would be Òsignificant.Ó 
127 Mendoza and Bygrave, supra note 114 at 12. 
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this advert, or is that merely another example, as Kohl (n28) discusses, of 
confusing automation with lack of responsibility? Does it matter that Sweeney 
could have conceivably asked not to be shown this kind of advert (though 
perhaps not in 2013) using GoogleÕs own tools? 
In the Jew Watch example, it is even harder to say a ÒdecisionÓ was made 
affecting any one individual significantly. Given the complexity of the search 
algorithms involved, dependent not only on variables derived from the searcher 
but also the general search environment, it is very hard to predict a particular 
ranking of sites being shown to a particular user in advance. Furthermore, and 
quite likely given the evidence quoted above, the searcher might not themselves 
be of the class affected (Jews).128 
3.1.1.1! Re-enter the Òright to an explanationÓ? 
Art 22 operates only under certain conditions. It does not apply when the 
data founding the decision was lawfully processed on the basis that it was 
necessary for entering a contract, authorised by law or, most crucially, based on 
explicit consent (art 22(2)).129 In these cases art 22 is excluded but, instead, 
Òsuitable measures to safeguard the data subjectÕs rightsÓ must be put in place, 
which should include Òat least the right to obtain human intervention [É] to 
express [the data subjectÕs] point of view, and to contest the decision.Ó(art 
22(3)) [italics added] 
Recital 71, explaining further art 22, then mentions all of the above 
safeguards but also adds an explicit Òright to an explanationÓ. Is this therefore 
another route to a Òright to an explanationÓ in art 22? This seems paradoxical. 
Art 22 gives a primary right, i.e. to stop wholly automated decision making. 
Would it give what seems an equally powerful right Ñ to an explanation Ñ in 
circumstances where the primary right is excluded because the data subject has 
already consented to the processing? 
To complicate matters further, under art 22(4), solely automated decisions 
based on sensitive personal data are illegal unless based on explicit consent or 
Òsubstantial public interestÓ. In both cases again, the main text requires the 
implementation of Òsuitable measuresÓ to safeguard the data subjectÕs rights, 
but does not list what these include, referring the reader back again to recital 
71 for assistance.130 So it may be possible to read a Òright to an explanationÓ 
into these cases as well. 
                                                      
128 We might compare this example to cases in some European courts concerning 
algorithmic defamation, where Google autocomplete appeared to generate a suggestion that a 
particular name was falsely associated with unsavoury, and hence reputation-harming. In such 
cases, however, the causal connection between the autocomplete text produced by the 
algorithm, and the reputational harm suffered by the data subject whose name was searched on, 
seems rather more obvious and is probably both more predictable and not dependent as much 
on the characteristics of the searcher. See discussion in Jones, supra note 81. 
129 GDPR, art 9(2). Every act of processing personal data in the GDPR requires a lawful 
ground of processing: see above discussion of consent as such a ground in section 3.1.1. 
130 Note also that para 2 of recital 71 details a long list of further suggestions to the data 
controller to Òensure fair and transparent processingÓ. These involve Òappropriate mathematical 
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Does it matter that the Òright to an explanationÓ is only mentioned in the 
recital text not the main article text? Here we encounter a pervasive problem in 
the GDPR in particular, and European legislation in general, which is the status 
of recitals. Recitals, while a part of the text, are assumed to be interpretative of 
the main text rather than creating free standing extra obligations.131 In the 
GDPR however, as a matter of political expediency, many issues too 
controversial for agreement in the main text have been kicked into the long 
grass of the recitals, throwing up problems of just how binding they are. 
Wachter et al. argue that the history of art 22 in the preliminary drafts indicates 
a deliberate omission of a Òright to an explanationÓ from the main text of art 22, 
not an accidental or ambiguous omission132 which implies the main text 
omission should rule out the Òright to an explanationÓ in the recital. However 
the use of the mandatory ÒshouldÓ in recital 71 muddies the waters further.133 
Our view is that these certainly seem shaky foundations on which to build a 
harmonised cross EU right to algorithmic explanation. 
Thus, returning to the Sweeney Google AdSense case study, we find several 
further issues. Firstly, if we accept for argumentÕs sake that a ÒdecisionÓ was 
made regarding her which had Òsignificant effectsÓ, then was it Òbased onÓ (art 
22(4)) an art 9 ÒspecialÓ category of data (in this case, race)? If so, it worth 
noting that art 9(2) of the GDPR probably required that she had given that data 
to Google by explicit consent. If that was so, she could potentially claim under 
art 22(4) the Òright to an explanationÓ of how the advertising delivery algorithm 
had worked. 
But was the decision based on race? Was it not more likely instead based on 
a multiplicity of ÒordinaryÓ information that Sweeney provided as signals to the 
ranking algorithm, plus signals from the rest of the Òalgorithmic groupÓ134, 
which together might statistically proxy race? Perhaps it was based on 
                                                      
or statistical procedures for the profiling, [and]technical and organisational measuresÓ. These 
seem only to be required (if they indeed are) in relation to processing of special categories of 
data (see art 22(4). Interestingly these move in functionality from merely fixing errors in 
functionality, to ensuring security, to Òprevents, inter alia, discriminatory effects on natural 
persons on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, religion or beliefs, trade union 
membership, genetic or health status or sexual orientationÓ (i.e. the special categories of data). 
This appears to point to the field of discrimination-aware data mining, still nascent in the 
research community at the time of the drafting of the GDPR, and can be seen as a transition 
from the traditional function of individual subject access rights (to ensure accurate and secure 
processing) to a more aspirational function. 
131 See Tadas Klimas and Jurate Vaiciukaite, The Law of Recitals in European Community 
Legislation, 15 ILSA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 1 (2008) at 92. They admit 
the usage of recitals in EU law can be perplexing and is at core politicised. ÒRecitals in EC law 
are not considered to have independent legal value, but they can expand an ambiguous 
provision's scope. They cannot, however, restrict an unambiguous provision's scope, but they 
can be used to determine the nature of a provision, and this can have a restrictive effect.Ó 
132 Wachter et al., supra note 11, at 9-11. 
133 Interestingly the French text of recital 71 appears to replicate the use of ÒshouldÓ 
(devrait) while the German text is differently constructed so that it does not. 
134 See 2.2.2 earlier and Mittelstadt et al., supra note 27. 
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information the advertiser provided to Google Ñ trigger names or keywords, 
for example? Ironically it seems like we are stuck in a Catch 22Ðlike situation: 
to operationalise this 'right to explanation', you need to know what its relevant 
input variables were, which itself may require access to something resembling 
an algorithmic explanation. 
Finally looking at the primary remedy art 22 provides, a Òhuman in the 
loopÓ, how valuable is it actually? Certainly, for issues of abusive or upsetting 
content thrown up by search or advertising algorithms, as in the Sweeney case, 
pretty useful: this is why Google and Facebook are both currently hiring many 
workers to manually trawl through their outputs using both real and 
hypothetical queries. In such circumstances an intuitive response is likely to be 
correct and this is something machines do badly. But typically, (see section 4.2) 
the types of ML algorithms that are highly multidimensional make ÒdecisionsÓ 
with which humans will struggle as much as, if not more than, machines: simply 
because of human inability to handle such an array of operational factors. In 
some kinds of cases Ñ for example, the much discussed Òtrolley problemÓ Ñ 
humans are as likely to make spur of the moment decisions as reasoned ones. 
For these reasons, Kamarinou et al. have suggested that machines may in fact 
soon be able to overcome certain Òkey limitations of human decision-makers 
and provide us with decisions that are demonstrably fairÓ.135 In such an event 
they recommend it might be better, not to have the ÒappealÓ from machine to 
human which art 22 implies, but the reverse.136 
3.2! GDPR, article 15: a way forward? 
A right which might be more usefully employed to get a transparent 
explanation of a ML system is part not of art 22 but rather a provision not 
specially related to automated decision making, i.e. art 15. Article 15 provides 
that the data subject shall have the right to confirm whether or not personal 
data relating to him or her are being processed by a controller and if that is the 
case, access to that personal data and the Òfollowing information.Ó This includes 
in the context of Òautomated decision making [É] referred to in art 22(1) and 
(4)Ó access to Òmeaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the 
significance and the envisaged consequences of such processingÓ (art 15(1)(h)). 
As noted above, this version of the 'right to an explanation' is not new, but 
has existed in the DPD since 1995.137 While this may seem a more 
straightforward way to get to such a right than via art 22, it has its own 
problems. 
                                                      
135 See Custers et al. eds., supra note 35; see also the resources and papers presented at the 
Fairness, Accountability and Transparency in Machine Learning workshop series (www.fatml.org). 
136 Dimitra Kamarinou et al., Machine learning with personal data, QUEEN MARY SCHOOL OF 
LAW LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 247/2016, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2865811. See also, 
in support of this view, Christopher Kuner et al., Machine learning with personal data: Is data 
protection law smart enough to meet the challenge?, 7 INTERNATIONAL DATA PRIVACY LAW 1Ð2 
(2017). 
137 DPD, art 12(a). 
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A first issue is timing. Wachter et al. suggest that art 15 Òsubject access 
rightsÓ should be contrasted with the Òinformation rightsÓ of the GDPR, arts 13 
and 14. Articles 13 and 14 require that information of various kinds should be 
made available to the data subject when data are collected from either her (art 
13), or from another party (art 14). This information is reminiscent of that 
required to inform consumers before entering, say, distance selling contracts. In 
contrast, art 15 refers to rights of ÒaccessÓ to data held by a data controller. This 
seems to imply data has been collected and processing has begun or taken place. 
From this Wachter et al. argue that the information rights under arts 13 or 14 
can only refer to the time before (ex ante) the subjectÕs data is input to the model 
of the system. As such the only information that can be provided then is 
information about the general Òsystem functionalityÓ of the algorithm, i.e. Òthe 
logic, significance, envisaged consequences and general functionality of an 
automated decision-making systemÓ. 
In the case of art 15 access rights, however, it seems access comes after 
processing. Therefore ex post tailored knowledge about specific decisions made 
in relation to a particular data subject can be provided, i.e. Òthe logic or 
rationale, reasons, and individual circumstances of a specific automated 
decisionÓ. 
This division seems moderately sensible and seems to promise a right to an 
explanation ex post, despite some textual quibbles.138 However, whether such an 
explanation can be ÒmeaningfulÓ in substance is another story as we discuss 
below in section 4. 
Secondly art 15(h) has a carve out, albeit only in recitals, for the protection 
of trade secrets and IP. ÒThat right should not adversely affect the rights or 
freedoms of others, including trade secrets or intellectual property and in 
particular the copyright protecting the software.Ó (recital 63). This probably 
explains the lack of use of this right throughout the EU, as a similar defence was 
included in the DPD. Recital 63 of the GDPR does progress things a little given 
it now states that this should not justify Òa refusal to provide all information to 
the data subjectÓ (emphasis added). Several other factors also give us hope for 
overcoming this significant barrier. First, as we discuss below (section 4.3.2), 
some explanation systems which build a model-of-a-model need not necessarily 
infringe IP rights. Secondly, the EU Trade Secrets Directive, the provisions of 
which must be adopted by member states by June 2018, specifically notes in 
                                                      
138 Wachter et al., supra note 11 argue that the art 15(h) ex post right still seems dubious 
given that it includes the right to the Òenvisaged consequences of such processingÓ [italics 
added], which, particularly when considered alongside the German version of the text, seems 
"future oriented". However recital 63, which annotates art 15, refers merely to the 
Òconsequences of processingÓ not the ÒenvisagedÓ consequences. Is this an accidental or 
inconsequential small textual difference, or is it enough to restrict the apparent scope of art 
15(1)(h) to Òsystem logicÓ? As we have already noted, the text of main article normally takes 
precedence over that of recitals. However it could be argued that EC laws should be interpreted 
teleologically and restricting art 15(h) to ex ante explanations seems against the purpose 
indicated by the recital.  
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recital 35 that the directive Òshould not affect the rights and obligations laid 
downÓ in the DPD139, going on to specifically name the right to access (art 12, 
DPD - now art 15 in the GDPR) Ñ although we caution, as previously discussed, 
that the status of recitals is murky at best. 
Finally, it has been suggested that the text of art 15(h)Õs Òright to meaningful 
informationÓ  is just as restricted as any remedy derived from art 22, given it 
refers to Òthe existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, 
referred to in Article 22(1) and (4)Ó. We disagree. It seems quite possible to 
view the reference to art 22 as merely instantiating one form of automated 
decision making, not excluding others, which are eg, achieved partially but not 
solely by automation. Furthermore, art 15(h) says the right to Òmeaningful 
informationÓ refers Òat leastÓ to these types of automated decision making. This 
seems to logically imply a wider scope. Given the dearth of European case law 
on the matter, it is hard to say this was a settled matter in the DPD. 
Next, drawing on literatures from computer science and elsewhere, we turn 
to some of the practical opportunities and challenges implementing any similar 
right to Òmeaningful information about the logic involvedÓ to that art 15 
potentially provides. 
4! IMPLEMENTING A RIGHT TO AN EXPLANATION 
Explanations and the demand for them in machine learning systems are not 
new, although emphasis has more recently turned to explanations for the 
decision-subject, rather than the user of the decision-support tool. Computer 
scientists have been long concerned that neural networks Òafford an end user 
little or no insight into either the process by which they have arrived at a given 
resultÓ140, and that Òpeople should be able to scrutinise their user model and to 
determine what is being personalised and how.Ó141 ML explanations are not just 
good for decision subjects but for system designers too. Such systems often do 
not work perfectly at the time of deployment. Given their probabilistic nature, 
we must expect them to fail in some cases. A system which has predictive 
accuracy of 90% on unseen data used to test it, would, in a simple case, be 
expected to fail at least 10% of the time on new unseen data. In the real world, 
this is usually worsened by the changing nature of tasks, the world and the 
phenomena ML systems are often expected to accurately model.142 Explanations 
                                                      
139 Recital 35, Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 
June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) 
against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure, 2016 O.J. (L 157) 1. 
140 Alan B. Tickle et al., The truth will come to light: Directions and challenges in extracting 
the knowledge embedded within trained artificial neural networks, 9 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NEURAL 
NETWORKS 6, 1057Ð1068 (1998), at 1057, doi:10.1109/72.728352. See also Zelznikow and 
StranieriÕs work in 1995, supra note 19. 
141 Kay, supra note 8 at 18. 
142Joao Gama et al., A survey on concept drift adaptation, 1 ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS 1 
(2013), doi:10.1145/2523813. 
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can be used to help assess the reliability of systems: for example assessing if the 
correlations that are being used are spurious, non-generalisable, or simply out-
of-date. These systems of feedback can help to both ensure system performance 
and support varying notions of quality.143 
Here, our focus is however mainly on decision subjects (data subjects, in DP 
parlance), who, as discussed above might display an array of overlapping 
reasons for wanting an explanation. Below we discuss what types of explanation 
are possible (and what they might substantially provide to decision-subjects), 
and consider in what situations and for who an explanation of an ML system 
may be difficult, limited or impossible. Finally, we suggest some positive 
avenues for explanation facilities including (a) explanations aimed at helping 
users to form better mental maps of how algorithms work, and thus to develop 
better trusted relationships with them; and (b) pedagogical (model-of-model) 
rather than decompositional (explain by taking apart) explanations as a way to 
avoid perceived IP and trade secrets restraints on ML algorithms. 
4.1! Types of explanation: Model-centric v subject-centric 
explanations 
We can broadly discern two categories of explanations that might be 
feasible. The first centres on and around the model itself. In this, we include 
logics that might be generally applicable to many decisions subjects as well as 
motivations, context, variables, and performance behind the model and the 
decision process. The second concerns particular predictions of interest, which 
may or may not lead to ÔdecisionsÕ. Here, even in complex models, some 
information can often be provided about ÔwhyÕ a particular prediction was made 
Ñ although this information has its limits. 
4.1.1! Model-centric explanations (MCEs) 
Model-centric explanations (MCEs) provide broad information about a ML 
model which is not decision or input-data specific. Computer scientists would 
refer to some aspects of this explanation as ÔglobalÕ, as it seeks to encapsulate 
the whole model Ñ although we deliberately avoid this terminology here, as it 
is likely to cause more confusion across disciplines than clarity. Furthermore, 
we extend the focus from the computational behaviour of a model to consider 
the motivations and context behind this model in action. As Singh et al. note, 
machine learning is part of a process, and the dimensions of ÔexplanationÕ that 
relate to the broader context are important and should not be ignored.144 MCEs 
provide one set of information to everyone, but there are limitations on how 
                                                      
143 In the ML field of recommender systems, this reason for explanation has been discussed 
under the term ÔscrutinyÕ, and is considered a hallmark of good user design. See Nava Tintarev 
and Judith Masthoff, Explaining Recommendations: Design and Evaluation, in RECOMMENDER 
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK (Francesco Ricci et al. eds., Springer, 2015). 
144 Jatinder Singh et al., Responsibility & Machine Learning: Part of a Process (Oct. 27, 
2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2860048 
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detailed, practical and relevant Ñ and thus, how ÒmeaningfulÓ Ñ such an 
explanation can be alone. 
Information provided with an MCE approach could include: 
-! setup information: the intentions behind the modelling process, the family 
of model (neural network, random forest, ensemble combination), the 
parameters used to further specify it before training; 
-! training metadata: summary statistics and qualitative descriptions of the 
input data used to train the model, the provenance of such data, and the 
output data or classifications being predicted in this model; 
-! performance metrics: information on the modelÕs predictive skill on unseen 
data, including breakdowns such as success on specific salient subcategories 
of data; 
-! estimated global logics: these are simplified, averaged, human-
understandable forms of how inputs are turned into outputs, which by 
definition are not complete, else you could use them instead of the complex 
model to achieve the same results. These might include variable importance 
scores, rule extraction results, or sensitivity analysis; 
-! process information: how the model was tested, trained, or screened for 
undesirable properties. 
Some work around algorithmic decision-making concerned with the 
consistency, or procedural regularity of the decisions being undertaken falls into 
this category.145 Information about the logics, which might be provided in the 
form of cryptographic assurances146, might help ensure consistency against an 
adversary intent on switching algorithmic systems behind-the-scenes, or making 
arbitrary decisions under the guise of a regular automated system. However, for 
much Òmeaningful informationÓ for individual data subjects, we are probably 
going to need to look beyond MCEs alone. 
4.1.2! Subject-centric explanations (SCAEs) 
Subject-centric explanations (SCEs) are built on and around the basis of an 
input record. They can only be provided in reference to a given query Ñ which 
could be real or could be fictitious or exploratory. As a result (and somewhat 
contrary to the approach of Wachter et al.), they are theoretically possible to 
give before or after a ÒdecisionÓ as discussed in the sense of data protection, if 
                                                      
145 Kroll et al., supra note 104. 
146 Cryptographic assurances often take the form of Ôzero-knowledge proofsÕ, where one 
party can provide information that mathematically verifies that a given statement is true, 
without conveying any further information (such as the structure of an algorithmic model). 
Some, limited prior work has demonstrated the feasibility of verifying certain types of ML 
systems with cryptographic methods, although this has largely been with a view to creating 
systems where analytics can be decentralised in a trusted manner, rather than centralised and 
verified. See George Danezis et al., Private Client-Side Profiling with Random Forests and Hidden 
Markov Models, in PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES, PETS 2012, (S. Fischer-Hbner and M. 
Wright eds., Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 7384., Springer, 2012). 
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access to the model is provided. Computer scientists would refer to this type of 
explanation as ÔlocalÕ, as the explanation is restricted to the region surrounding 
a set of data. Complex models cannot be explained effectively in their entirety 
Ñ which is why they have rapidly become known as Ôblack boxesÕ in the media. 
Despite this, only considering certain relevant parts of them at any one time 
might allow for more useful explanations. 
To better understand this, we introduce a concept from computer science: 
the Ôcurse of dimensionalityÕ. Data can be thought of geometrically: with two 
numeric variables, you can display all data on a two-dimensional scatter plot. 
With three variables, a three-dimensional one. Conceptually, you can scale this 
up to however many variables you have in your data. As you increase the 
dimensions (the number of variables) the number of ways that all potential 
values of them can be combined grows exponentially. It is this dynamic which 
makes the data especially complex to comprehend. Layered onto this, models 
which mix arbitrary combinations of variables in multiple different ways in 
parallel, interdependent ways, means that the complexity of the data by its 
extent is compounded by the complexity of the procedures used to analyse it. 
Explaining everything in one go, as MCEs try to, quickly becomes unwieldy.
 
Figure 1 Subject-centred explanations in practice. The dotted line represents a machine learned 
decision boundary, where the ticks are classified one way, and the crosses another. This is a highly 
simplified, illustrative diagram that consciously omits uncertainty, or points misclassified during 
training in order to illustrate a broader point. 
Despite this, explanations are possible if we zoom in to the part of the space 
in and around a vector of variables that interest us. By doing this, the system 
can become considerably more interpretable. Take the simple (and simplified) 
example above in Figure 1. The dotted line represents a machine learned 
decision boundary over two input variables. Using this boundary, we can classify 
points into ticks and crosses, which might, for example, be acceptance of an 
application for a financial product. Giving out the whole model in a useful form 
will be challenging, especially since usually there are more than the two or three 
dimensions we can grasp visually with relative ease. Yet zooming in to a 
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particular point: such as why were ?-1 and ?-2 rejected, might be easier to 
explain. ?-1 is easier in many ways Ñ it seems that they have to just increase 
variable x to switch the decision, and this is helped a little if they also increase 
variable y at the same time, and hindered if they donÕt. Yet ?-2 is slightly trickier. 
They could increase or reduce variable y, or increase or reduce variable x. This 
seems pretty unsatisfactory Ñ the individual is likely to wonder (in an MCE 
fashion) why the model was shaped to have these odd ÔpocketsÕ they could be 
stuck in, anyway. What is clear is that sometimes, models can be explained in 
terms of one or two things an individual could change. In other cases, they can 
only be framed in terms of many variables, which change in inconsistent and 
non-linear ways. 
This is an active field of research which we believe needs more consideration 
from a legal perspective. Here, we distinguish between four main types of SCEs: 
-! Sensitivity-based subject-centric explanations: what changes in my input 
data would have made my decision turn out otherwise?147 (Where do I have 
to move in Figure 1 to be classified differently?) 
-! Case-based subject-centric explanations: which data records used to train 
this model are most similar to mine?148 (Who are the ticks and crosses 
nearest to me?) 
-! Demographic-based subject-centric explanations: what are the characteristics 
of individuals who received similar treatment to me?149 (Who, more broadly, 
was similarly classified?) 
-! Performance-based subject-centric explanations: how confident are you of 
my outcome? Are individuals similar to me classified erroneously more or 
less often than average? (How many ticks and crosses nearer me were 
misclassified during training? Am I a difficult case?) 
Unlike MCEs, SCEs are less suited for discussing aspects such as procedural 
regularity. Instead, they are more about building a relationship between these 
tools and their users or decision subjects that can provide ÒmeaningfulÓ 
explanation. In this sense, SCEs are considerably more linked to communities of 
interface design and human-computer interaction than communities concerned 
with engineering issues, such as the cryptographic assurances discussed above. 
                                                      
147 Wojciech Samek et al., Evaluating the visualization of what a deep neural network has 
learned, IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems (forthcoming), 
doi:10.1109/TNNLS.2016.2599820; Marco Tulio Ribeiro et al. ÒWhy should I trust you?Ó: 
Explaining the predictions of any classifier, in KDD '16 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 22ND ACM SIGKDD 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING, 1135-1144 (2016), 
doi:10.1145/2939672.2939778. 
148 Donal Doyle et al., A review of explanation and explanation in case-based reasoning 
(Department of Computer Science, Trinity College, Dublin, 2003). 
149 Liliana Adrissono et al., Intrigue: Personalized recommendation of tourist attractions for 
desktop and handheld devices, 17 APPLIED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 8-9, 687Ð714 (2003); Tintarev 
and Masthoff, supra note 143. 
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4.2! Barriers to explanations 
MCEs and SCEs are far from perfect solutions, let alone easy ones to 
operationalise in many cases. Here, we present an in-exhaustive overview of 
two issues in this field: one that relates to the domain of decision-making, and 
one that relates to the interaction between who needs an explanation, and how 
solid that explanation is likely to be for them. 
4.2.1! Domain: some tasks are easier to ÔexplainÕ than others 
Meaningful explanations of ML do not work well for every task. As we began 
to discuss above, the tasks they work well on often have only a few input 
variables that are combined in relatively straightforward ways, such as 
increasing or decreasing relationships. Systems with more variables will 
typically perform better than simpler systems, so we may end up with a trade-
off between performance and explicability. 
One way to deal with this is if different input variables can be combined in 
a clear and visual way. Images are a good example of the latter: for a ML system, 
and especially since the rise in popularity of deep learning, colour channels in 
pixels are treated as individual inputs. While we struggle to read a table full of 
numbers at a glance, when an image is meaningful, the brain can process 
thousands of pixels at once in relation to one another. Similarly, words hold a 
lot of information, and a visual displaying 'which words in a cover letter would 
have got me the job, were they different' is also meaningful. 
Design might help us with some of these challenges. As an example, 
smartphones produce a great number of data points about movements. In a ML 
system we might try to predict whether individuals are sitting, standing etc. 
from the accelerometer and gyroscope in their smartphone: such a system might 
have 561 variables, after processing for time and frequency.150 This is not on the 
face of it a system whose inferences are easy to explain to humans. Yet were we 
to connect this dataset to a well-designed visualisation about the phoneÕs 
position in space, we might be able to collapse these 561 variables into 
something visually compelling. 
Even visualisation cannot deal with the basic problem that in some systems 
there is no theory correlating input variables to things humans understand as 
causal or even as ÒthingsÓ. In ML systems, unlike simulation models, the features 
that are being fed in might lack any convenient or clear human interpretation 
in the first place, even if we are creative about it. LinkedIn, for example, claim 
to have over 100,000 variables held on every user that feed into ML 
modelling.151 Many of these will not be clear variables like ÒageÓ, but more 
abstract ways you interact with the webpage, such as how long you take to click, 
                                                      
150 See Jorge-L Reyes-Ortiz et al., Transition-Aware Human Activity Recognition Using 
Smartphones, 171 NEUROCOMPUTING 1 (2015), doi:10.1016/j.neucssom.2015.07.085. 
151 Kun Liu, Developing Web-scale ML at LinkedInÑfrom Soup to Nuts, Presented at the 
NIPS Software Engineering for Machine Learning (Dec. 13, 2014). 
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the time you spend reading, or even text you write but later delete without 
posting.152 These variables may well hold predictive signals about individual 
characteristics or behaviours, but we lack compelling ways to clearly display 
these explanations for meaningful human interpretation. In these cases, we 
must ask Ñ what could a satisfactory explanation even look like for decisions 
based on this data? Do we even possess the mental vocabulary of categories and 
concepts to grasp the important aspects in the data? 
While we generally focus on visual, verbal or numeric SCEs, there are 
interesting opportunities for building something similar to ÒexplanationsÓ into 
physical objects, or other senses, such as sound or air current.153 This is 
important in relation to ambient decision-making, and while its relative 
imprecision means it is perhaps less likely to provide legal certainty or enable 
legal remedies, less precise explanations playfully built into interfaces and 
environments might still play a part in data protection by design (see below) 
and help create more legitimate or trusted systems. 
4.2.2! Users: explanations might fail those seeking them most 
It is worth considering the typical data subject that might seek an 
explanation of a ML-assisted decision. We might expect them to have received 
outputs they felt were anomalous. They might feel misclassified or poorly 
represented by classification systems Ñ hardly uncommon, as literatures on the 
problematic and value-laden nature of statistical classification note.154 While 
some might wholesale reject the schema of classifications used, others might 
want to know if such a decision was made soundly. For these decision subjects, 
an explanation might help. 
However, it also seems reasonable to assume that individuals with outputs 
they felt were anomalous are more likely than average to have provided inputs 
that can genuinely be considered statistically anomalous compared to the data 
an algorithmic system was trained on. To a ML system, they are ÒweirdosÓ. 
Researchers have long recognised some outcomes are more difficult to 
predict than others for ML systems, given their relative individual complexity.155 
                                                      
152 Sauvik Das and Adam Kramer, Self-Censorship on Facebook, in Proceedings of the 
Seventh International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media, 120Ð127 (AAAI, 2013). 
153 For some work in this space, see Giles Lane, Lifestreams: Tactile Poetry, PROBOSCIS [BLOG] 
(Mar. 21, 2016), http://proboscis.org.uk/5098/lifestreams-tactile-poetry/; see also interactive 
cubes for better understanding smart home sensor data in Steven Houben et al., Physikit: Data 
Engagement Through Physical Ambient Visualizations in the Home, in CHIÕ16 (ACM, 2016), 
doi:10.1145/2858036.2858059. 
 
154 JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE (Yale University Press, 1998); Bowker and Starr, 
supra note 52; SALLY ENGLE MERRY, THE SEDUCTIONS OF QUANTIFICATION (University of Chicago 
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155 Gary M. Weiss, Mining with rarity: a unifying framework, 6 ACM SIGKDD EXPLORATIONS 
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Given the many variables being used for each record, spotting these individuals 
cannot be done with methods such as visualisation, which we often use to detect 
outliers. Most of the phenomena we are interested in modelling, such as 
burglary, child abuse, terrorism or loan defaults, are rare, at least in comparison 
to their non-occurrence, and this also makes prediction harder.156 
ML practitioners expect this kind of dynamic within the data they use. The 
common technique of boosting relies on this type of distribution of patterns. 
Boosting involves training a ML algorithm, then looking at which cases it gets 
wrong. These cases are assumed to hold different patterns that have not been 
adequately picked up by the current system, so are then weighted to seem more 
important for a subsequent round of training to be combined with the first later. 
In this round, the higher weighting on those previously misclassified emphasises 
to the system being trained that these contain patters that are important, but 
perhaps less straightforward, to learn.157 
Why might this challenge meaningful explanations? SCEs practically focus 
on taking the model you have, selecting a certain part of it, and modelling it in 
a simpler and more interpretable way. This simplification necessarily discards 
the complex outlier cases, just as you might do when you simplify a scatterplot 
into a smooth trend-line or a Ôline of best fitÕ. Optimising an explanation system 
for human interpretability necessarily means diluting predictive performance to 
capture only the main logics of a system: if a more interpretable system with 
exactly the same predictive performance existed, why use the more opaque one? 
Traditionally, this has been described as the ÒfidelityÓ of an explanation facility 
for a machine learning system: how well does it mimic the behaviour of the 
system it is trying to explain?158 The more pressing, related question is, are the 
cases that an interpretable model can no longer predict simply distributed at 
random, or are they correlated with those we might believe to have a higher 
propensity to request a right to explanation? We lack empirical research in this 
area. If the users of complex ML systems who seek explanations are likely to be 
these Òrare birdsÓ, then it is worrying that they are the most likely to be failed. 
4.3! Opportunities for better explanations 
Better explanations are possible, although it may involve rethinking how we 
use explanations. As emphasised above, this is far from a new field of research. 
In this section, we highlight two promising avenues; the first being long 
understood in the design field, that explanations that allow users to interactively 
explore algorithmic systems can strongly enable individuals to develop good and 
trustworthy (although not perfect or complete) mental models of the systems 
they use and are subject to. The second rests on another insight, harking back 
to the days of expert systems Ñ you do not have to have access to the innards 
                                                      
156 Taeho Jo and Nathalie Japkowicz, Class imbalances versus small disjuncts, 6 ACM 
SIGKDD EXPLORATIONS NEWSLETTER 1, 40-49 (2004). 
157 Robert E Schapire, The Boosting Approach to ML: An Overview, in Nonlinear Estimation 
and Classification (Springer, 2003). 
158 Tickle et al., supra note 140, at 1058. 
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of a model to attempt to explain it. Many of the most promising methods to 
explain algorithmic systems do not try to ÒdecomposeÓ or open the model, but 
try to ÒpedagogicallyÓ fit a simpler model around it, querying the black box like 
an oracle to estimate its core logics in an intelligible form. 
4.3.1! Exploring with explanations 
Above we introduced the idea of model-centric (MCEs) vs subject-centric 
(SCEs) explanations. Which are best for helping users understand complex ML 
systems? The best explanations of complex systems seem to be ÒexploratoryÓ, 
using subject-centric inputs. Experimental tests have found that interfaces that 
provided SCEs rather than MCEs appeared far more effective at helping users 
complete tasks, even where the experiment was constructed so that unusually, 
the same amount of information was provided by both.159 For users, it seems 
that when done well, SCEs are more appealing, convenient and compelling. 
Explanation facilities might help here to allow decision subjects to build more 
effective and relevant mental models, and work better with algorithmic 
systems.160 Some evidence has shown that the availability of explanations of this 
sort can build trust both in users and in designers.161 
Drawing on the literature on humanÐcomputer interaction (HCI), SCEs can 
be thought of as ÒseamsÓ in the design of a ML system.162 Seamless design hides 
algorithmic structures, providing certain kinds of effortlessness and invisibility. 
This promotes an acceptance of technology based on its effect: the idea that 
when a machine runs efficiently and appears to settle matters of fact, attention 
is often drawn away from its internal complexity to focus only on the inputs and 
outputs.163 Yet ÒseamfulÓ algorithmic systems, where individuals have points in 
the designed systems to question, explore and get to know them, help build 
important, albeit partial, mental models that allow individuals to better adapt 
                                                      
159 Dianne C Berry and Donald E Broadbent, Explanation and verbalization in a computer-
assisted search task, 39 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY SECTION A 4, 585-609 
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163 See Bruno Latour, PandoraÕs hope: Essays on the reality of science studies. (Harvard 
University Press, 1999).  
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their behaviour and negotiate with their environments.164 By introducing these 
ÒseamsÓ of explanation, it has been demonstrated that even new users can 
quickly build mental models of ML systems to the level of those with seasoned 
experience.165 ÒSeamfulÓ systems might help restore what Mireille Hildebrandt, 
drawing on Talcott Parsons, terms Òdouble contingencyÓ Ñ the mutual ability 
to anticipate, or Òcounter-profileÓ how an agent is being ÒreadÓ by another, so 
she can change her own actions in response.166 
The GDPR, as discussed in detail below at 6.2, mandates Privacy by Design 
(PbD). This might encourage us to think of how ML systems can best be built to 
best allow users to understand them. Exploratory systems allow individuals to 
explore the logics of algorithms for themselves, not Òex anteÓ or Òex postÓ 
decisions, but as they use and interact with the systems. As discussed above, one 
subject-centric approach is to allow a user to query a model with Ôwhat it would 
have doneÕ with a certain set of data points, and what would have made it 
different; or which types of ÔnearbyÕ individuals or data-points would have 
received similar or different treatment. 
Some SCEs  already let individuals hypothetically explore the logics 
happening around their own data points. Tools already exist to let you Òtry outÓ 
what your credit score might be online, through filling in a questionnaire, for 
example, or signing into these using your data profile (for example, by 
authorising a ÔsoftÕ check on your credit file, or potentially one day, by giving 
access to your social media API). More advanced approaches might let a data 
subject see how the system might make decisions concerning other users, thus 
taking the user out of their own Òfilter bubblesÓ. 
Unfortunately, it will be easier to build SCEs that let you explore the logics 
around yourself rather than around others, because simulating the inputs of 
others convincingly is hard. In relatively simple experiments, researchers have 
attempted to Ôreverse engineerÕ algorithmic systems online in order to study 
phenomena such as price discrimination, by simulating the profiles of diverse 
individuals while browsing.167 However, presenting valid hypothetical subjects 
other than yourself to many of these systems is becoming increasingly difficult 
in an era of personalisation. British intelligence services have noted the 
challenge in providing data such as Òa long, false trail of location services on a 
mobile phone that adds up with an individualÕs fake back-storyÓ, with the former 
director of operations for MI6 noting that Òthe days in which intelligence officers 
could plausibly adopt different identities and personas are pretty much coming 
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to an end.Ó168 Individuals everywhere, not just MI6, will find it harder to ÒfakeÓ 
a new persona without changing their lifestyle, haunts, friends etc., in these 
days of the Òdigital exhaustÓ. 
A problem frequently raised with this kind of repeated querying of ML 
systems to establish a Òmental modelÓ is that it might be used by users to Ògame 
the systemÓ. In many cases, this is more unlikely than it is often assumed. In 
private sector systems such as targeted advertising deriving from social media 
information , users anecdotally do often try to ÒgameÓ or self-optimise systems 
with false data such as birthdates or locations. Yet in public sector cases, such 
as ML sentencing and parole systems, it seems unlikely that gaming will be a 
large problem. As the criminological literature has noted, any evidence that the 
severity of sentencing deters crime is patchy at best.169 If this is true then it seems 
unlikely that prisoners will change their characteristics just to attempt to game 
a recidivism algorithm that will not even be used until after they have been 
apprehended. Perhaps within prison, individuals might seek to ÔgameÕ an 
algorithm used during parole, by behaving well, or taking specified courses, for 
example. Yet for this to be gaming, we would need to assume that the act of 
taking these courses, or behaving well, would not be useful or transformative in 
and of itself. 
For important decisions, we might question if a system that ÒworksÓ but can 
so easily be gamed is not a system which is already too fragilely reliant on 
obfuscation to achieve its policy goals. If all that is preventing misuse is Ôkeeping 
the lidÕ on the logic, then it is not a great stretch to assume some individuals or 
organisations, likely assisted by money and power, have already pried the lid 
open further than others. In particular, researchers have demonstrated that with 
significant financial resources, there is a feasibility of Òmodel stealingÓ ie reverse 
engineering models such as those Google and Amazon offer as-a-service via APIs 
. 170 It might also be questioned if a system is only based on ÒentrenchedÓ factors 
that are costly or impossible to change or hide (eg race),is this really a fair 
system? (see section 2.2.1).171 
4.3.2! Explaining black boxes without opening them 
As we have seen, the way that ML systems optimise for performance usually 
comes at the expense of internal interpretability, Since early research into 
"expert systems" in the late 80s onwards, there has been awareness that a mere 
trace of the ÒlogicÓ of how an automated system transformed an input into an 
                                                      
168 Sam Jones, The spy who liked me: BritainÕs changing secret service, FINANCIAL TIMES (Sep. 
29, 2016). 
169 See, e.g., amongst the broad literature, Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the twenty-first 
century, 42 CRIME AND JUSTICE 1 (2013), doi:10.1086/670398. 
170 Florian Tramr et al., Stealing Machine Learning models via Prediction APIs, in USENIX 
SECURITY SYMPOSIUM, AUSTIN, TX, USA, AUGUST 11 2016 (2016).  
171 On the danger of inequalities and gaming, see generally Jane Bambauer and Tal Zarsky, 
The Algorithm Game [draft manuscript, on file with authors]. 
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output was not "meaningful" to a human, let alone to a non-expert. Researchers 
since have generally seen explanation as an entirely separate optimisation 
challenge Ñ decoupling algorithmic reasoning from algorithmic explanation.172 
There are two main styles of decoupled algorithmic explanations.173 They 
differ from MCEs and SCES, which concern the focus of explanation, to consider 
the way in which that explanation (MCE or SCE) is arrived at. The first type is 
the decompositional explanation. Decompositional approaches attempt to open 
Ñ to decompose Ñ the black box, and understand how the structures within, 
such as the weights, neurons, decision trees and architecture, can be used to 
shed light on the patterns that they encode. Decompositional approaches 
require access to the equations that make up the model, or at least certain 
aspects of its weights, in order to build explanation systems. 
Some ML systems are decompositionally more explainable than others. The 
structure of this model lends itself more easily to the understanding of the 
predictions they give. Many regression methods Ñ which are, in fact, ML Ñ are 
so explainable that they are commonly used within social sciences to build 
models of the world to better understand phenomena from obesity to voting, 
rather than to predict them. Other systems are more difficult to pull apart, 
although there is considerable research progress being made even in 
decompositional approaches to complex deep learning systems.174 
There are also decompositional-style methods to obtain further information 
on explanations during training of a model, rather than afterwards. These are 
more restricted, as they also require the original data, rather than just the 
trained model. Random forests, which are ensembles of individually 
interpretable decision-trees trained on a dataset, but that ÔvoteÕ on the correct 
classification (a computational approach to the Òwisdom of the crowdÓ), have a 
variety of commonly used Òvariable importanceÓ measures, which can be 
optionally calculated at computational cost while building the model in the first 
place. These measures take each of the variables that feed into a model in turn, 
add a random amount of noise to them, and see what effect it has on the 
accuracy of the model. For example, a credit scoring model might take age, 
income and education as input data. We would first train a model correctly, 
then add some random noise to ÔageÕ, train the model again, and see if it 
performs significantly worse. If it does, we might say that age is an important 
variable.175 These approaches are often used operationally to publicly explain 
                                                      
172 Michael R. Wick and William B. Thompson, Reconstructive expert system explanation, 54 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1Ð2, 33Ð70 (1992), doi:10.1016/0004-3702(92)90087-E. This 
corresponds to the ÒnaveÓ approach Kroll et al. talk about of merely dumping source code, 
inputs and outputs (supra note 104). 
173 Combinations between these two styles are also possible. See Tickle et al., supra note 
140. 
174 See, e.g., George Montavon et al., Explaining nonlinear classification decisions with deep 
Taylor decomposition, 65 PATTERN RECOGNITION C, 211-222 (2017). 
175 See Carolin Strobl et al., Bias in random forest variable importance measures: Illustrations, 
sources and a solution, 8 BMC BIOINFORMATICS 1, 25 (2007). 
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ML systems, such as in a Durham Police recidivism risk system, currently being 
rolled out to support custody officers as to whether they should recommend bail 
upon arrest.176 Explanations are provided by the Òvariable importanceÓ weights 
of different variables used in the random-forestÑdriven recidivism scores. 
On the other end of the spectrum, pedagogical systems Ñ more recently also 
referred to as model agnostic systems Ñ do not even need to open the black box. 
They can get the information they need by simply querying it, like an oracle.177 
Pedagogical systems have the great advantage that since they demand a much 
lower level of model access and are thus less likely to run into the IP or trade 
secrecy barriers embedded in art 15(h) (see section 3.2 above). Indeed, for firms 
that provide remote access to querying their models Ñ for example, through an 
API Ñ it might be technically possible to build pedagogical explanations even if 
the firm does not directly condone it. Furthermore pedagogical systems cannot 
easily be reverse engineered to construct a model of equal performance, as some 
might fear. In particular, the subject-specific nature of the vast majority of 
pedagogical explanation systems means that even if an algorithm could be 
siphoned and rebuilt elsewhere, that reconstruction would be limited to 
individuals similar to those to which the explanations related. More critically, if 
a more explainable system was similarly accurate, why use a pedagogical system 
in the first place? Statistical controls also exist that might be fruitfully 
repurposed to prevent Ôover-explainingÕ to any one person or organisation, 
notably in the area of Òdifferential privacyÓ guarantees.178 
5! SEEKING BETTER REMEDIES THAN EXPLANATIONS WITH THE GDPR 
5.1! Avoiding a Òtransparency fallacyÓ 
Above, we have seen a large number of difficulties (as well as some 
opportunities!) around providing meaningful explanations in ML systems.  This 
leads us in this section to stop and briefly consider if Òthe game is worth the 
candleÓ: if meaningful information about the logic of ML is so hard to provide, 
how sure are we that explanations are actually an effective remedy and if so, to 
achieve what? Above in section 2.2.3 we already began to explore a little 
sceptically the notion of transparency as a remedy, drawing on historical 
experience from the financial crash and FOI. A useful warning can also be taken 
about so called remedies or safeguards that may simply not work by considering 
the history of consent in information privacy. 
                                                      
176 Sheena Urwin, Presentation at TRILCon Õ17: Algorithms in Durham Constabulary 
custody suites Ñ How accurate is accurate? (May 3, 2017). 
177 For examples of pedagogical systems, see Ribeiro et al., supra note 147; Anupam Datta et 
al., Algorithmic transparency via quantitative input influence, in TRANSPARENT DATA MINING FOR BIG 
AND SMALL DATA (Tania Cerquitelli et al. eds., Springer, 2017). 
178 Cynthia Dwork, Differential privacy: A survey of results, in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS OF MODELS OF COMPUTATION (Springer, 2008). 
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Privacy scholars are already very familiar with the notion that consent, often 
regarded by lay audiences as the primary safeguard for control of personal data, 
has in the online world become a mere husk of its former self, often described 
as ÒmeaninglessÓ or Òillusory.Ó179 Why is this? Online consent is most often 
obtained by displaying a link to a privacy policy at the time of entry to or 
registration with a site, app or network, and asking the user to accede to these 
terms and conditions by ticking a box. As there is no chance to negotiate and 
little evidence that the majority of users either read, understand or truly 
consider these conditions, it is hard to see how this consent is either Òfreely 
given, specific, informed and unambiguousÓ despite these being conditions for 
valid consent under the GDPR.180 Consent as an online institution in fact 
arguably no longer provides any semblance of informational self- determination 
but merely legitimises the extraction of personal data from unwitting data 
subjects. As behavioural economics have taught us, many users have a faulty 
understanding of the privacy risks involved, due to asymmetric access to 
information and hard-wired human failure to properly assess future, intangible 
and contingent risks. Even in the real rather than online world, consent is 
manipulated by those such as employers or insurers who can exert pressures 
that render ÒfreeÓ consent imaginary. Even if we do posit in a rather utopian 
way that consent can be given once to a data controller in a free and informed 
way, constant vigilance will be needed as privacy policies and practices change 
frequently. It is unreasonable and increasingly unsustainable to abide by the 
liberal paradigm and expect ordinary users to manage their own privacy via 
consent in the world of online dependence and Òbastard data.Ó181 As a result, it 
is now beyond trite to talk about a Ònotice and choice fallacy.Ó182 
Relying on individual rights to explanation as the means for users to take 
control of ML systems risks creating a similar Òtransparency fallacyÓ (adapting 
HealdÕs notion of a Òtransparency illusionÓ183). Individual data subjects are not 
empowered to make use of the kind of algorithmic explanations they are likely 
to be offered even if (unlikely as it seems) the problems identified in section 4 
are overcome. Individuals are mostly too time-poor, resource-poor, and lacking 
                                                      
179 See discussion and references supra section 2.2.2 and supra note 59. 
180 GDPR, art 4(11). The GDPR does attempt to improve the quality of consent with some 
new measures such as the requirement that the data controller must be able to prove consent 
was given (art 7(1)), that terms relating to consent in user contracts must be distinguishable 
from other matters, and written in Òclear and plain languageÓ (art 7(2)); and that in 
determining if consent was given ÒfreelyÓ, account should be taken of whether the provision of 
the service was conditional on the provision of data not necessary to provide that service (art 
7(4)). It is submitted however that these changes are not major, and that much will depend on 
the willingness of EU member state DP regulators to take complex, expensive and possibly 
unenforceable actions against major data organisations (Google, Facebook, Amazon and others) 
emanating from non-EU origins with non-EU law norms. The Common Statement of 5 DPAs 
(supra note 76) is certainly an interesting first shot over the bows. 
181 See McNamee, supra note 60. 
182 See full discussion in Edwards, supra note 59.  
183 See Heald, supra note 100. 
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in the necessary expertise to meaningfully make use of these individual rights. 
In some ways the transparency fallacy is even worse than its consent cousin, 
since the explanation itself may not be meaningful enough to confer much 
autonomy even on the most empowered data subject. 
Ananny and Crawford184 very usefully recount the numerous ways in which 
transparency Òas a method to see, understand and govern complex systemsÓ Ð 
both in the past, and now in the time of algorithmic ML systems Ð is not only 
limited but sometimes also misleading and even actively unhelpful. Inter alia, 
they note that transparency can support Òneoliberal models of agencyÓ, placing 
a tremendous burden on individuals both to seek out information about a 
system, interpret it, and determine its significance, only then to find out they 
have little power to change things anyway, being Òdisconnected from powerÓ.  
Liberal democracy in the past has taught us Òthe feeling that seeing something 
may lead to control over itÓ but in fact in its search for a technical solution, 
dependence on transparency may occlude the true problems which rest in 
societal power relations and institutions as much as the software tools 
employed. 
Next, therefore, we consider if in the stampede to find a legally enforceable 
right to an explanation, other new user rights and tools in the GDPR have been 
given undeservedly little attention. 
5.2! Beyond explanation rights: making fuller use of the GDPR for 
better machine learning 
In this subsection, we explore this direction, with reference to two main 
rights: the right to erasure (colloquially often called Òright to be forgottenÓ) in 
art 17, and the right to data portability in art 20, as well as a proposed 
supporting environment for enforcement the GDPR establishes using a varied 
range of instruments, such as Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs) and 
privacy seals. 
5.2.1! GDPR, article 17: the right to erasure (Òright to be forgottenÓ) 
Article 17 of the GDPR states that the Òdata subject shall have the right to 
obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her 
without undue delayÓ.185 This is not an unrestricted right. Erasure can be 
obtained on one of various grounds186, including that the data are no longer 
necessary in relation to the purposes for which they were collected; that the 
                                                      
184 See Mike Annany and Kate Crawford ÒSeeing without knowing: Limitations of the 
transparency ideal and its application to algorithmic accountabilityÓ (2016) New Media and 
Society 1-17. 
185 The right to erasure (Òright to be forgottenÓ) in arts 17 and 18 (restriction of processing) 
emerged after the landmark CJEU case, Case C̻131/12, Google Spain v Gonzlez, (May 13, 
2014) and is both wider in effect and more specified than the rule elaborated in that case out of 
the DPD. 
186 Art 17(1). 
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data subject has withdrawn her consent to processing; that the personal data 
have been unlawfully processed; that the data must be erased under local state 
or EU law (e.g. because of rehabilitation of offenders or bankruptcy rules); or 
that the data was provided while a child under 16. Most usefully, erasure can 
be sought if the data was being used to profile the data subject and had been 
collected lawfully but without her consent.187 The right can conceivably be 
repelled by the controller on Òcompelling legitimate groundsÓ and there are 
other exceptions, including to safeguard freedom of expression and the 
historical record.188 
In the context of ML, we believe a data subject might usefully seek erasure 
as a remedy in at least three main circumstances. 
5.2.1.1! Seeking erasure of personal data ÒconcerningÓ a data subject 
Firstly, a data subject might seek erasure of her personal data simply because 
she does not wish the data controller to have a copy of it any longer. 
An important issue here is what personal data in the ML system an 
individual data subject has rights over. Clearly she has the right to erase her 
explicitly provided data used as inputs to an ML system (e.g. name, age, medical 
history) but does she have the right to erase observed data about her behaviour 
and movements both in the real and virtual world?  This is important because 
we have already seen that ML systems such as those run by Facebook or 
LinkedIn make heavy use of this e.g. type of links clicked on on-site, photos 
viewed, pages ÒlikedÓ; or, in the real world, location and movement as perhaps 
tracked by a GPS in smartphone or wearable is a commonly used variable. While 
this implicitly provided data, or sometimes metadata,  should arguably qualify 
as personal data if it clearly allows a data subject to be identifiable (e.g. by 
Òsingling outÓ) it does not appear the history of art 17 ever contemplated its use 
for such purposes. 
Perhaps most importantly in relation to ML, what about the inferences that 
are made by the system when the data subjectÕs inputs are used as query? These 
seem what a user would perhaps most like to delete Ñ especially in a world of 
Òbastard dataÓ where one systemÕs output becomes anotherÕs input. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the A29 WP, in the context of the right to portability (see below, 
5.2.2) have already issued guidance that the inferences of a system is not the 
data of the subject but ÒbelongsÓ to the system that generated it.189 It is not yet 
clear if this approach would be advised regarding the right to erase, though it 
logically might, as the two rights (17 and 20) are seen as complementary. In 
that case, we seem to have a clear conflict with the already acknowledged right 
                                                      
187 i.e. on the ground of the legitimate interests of the data controller under art 6(1)(f) or, 
for a public data controller, the public interest under art 6(1). 
188 There is no guidance in recital 69 on what this might mean. Note that art 17 rights can 
also be excluded by EU states where exercising them affects important public interests (art 
17(3)): these include freedom of expression, Ôpublic interestÕ in the area of health, public 
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189 See A29 WP, infra note 207. 
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of a data subject to erase an inference from GoogleÕs search algorithm (i.e. the 
Òright to be forgottenÓ, as vindicated in Google Spain). 
5.2.1.2! Seeking withdrawal of personal data from a model: Òmachine 
ÒunlearningÓ 
Secondly, a data subject might seek erasure of her data from the model of a 
trained ML system because she was unhappy with the inferences about her that 
the model produced. In other words, she wants to alter the model. This is 
unlikely to be helpful because it is unlikely that one data subject withdrawing 
their personal data would make much difference to a trained model : ML 
systems often require multiple examples of a phenomenon of interest to 
recognise the pattern. They are calibrated (ÔregularisedÕ) this way to avoid 
modelling the ÒnoiseÓ or random elements in the data (ÔoverfittingÕ), rather than 
just capturing the main ÒsignalÓ hoped to be fruitful in analysing future cases 
after the model is built. To make effective use of this right to alter models, whole 
groups would need to collaborate explicitly or implicitly to request erasure. We 
might imagine a data subject whose data generated by a wearable fitness tracker 
phenomena have been correlated with a rare medical condition. She might 
persuade the rest of her Òalgorithmic groupÓ to withdraw their personal data 
from the system so that the model could no longer make this correlation. This 
seems extremely difficult to organise in practice, as well as probably also 
involving unwanted privacy disclosures. 
5.2.1.3! Machine ÒunlearningÓtake 2:  erasing models as themselves personal data 
Thirdly, a data subject might seek erasure of an entire model (or aspects of 
it) on the grounds that it is her personal data. This might be based on the 
assertion that the model itself is the personal data of each and every data subject 
whose input data helped train and refine it. On the face of it this seems 
implausible. To a lawyer, a ML model resembles more a structure of commercial 
use which will probably be protected by trade secrets or possibly, by an IP right 
such as a patent or, in Europe a database right190, which is a right essentially 
over the arrangement of data in a certain system, personal or otherwise, rather 
than the data itself. 
Yet for ML specialists, an argument might be made that personal data used 
to create a trained model might be fully or partially reconstructed by querying 
the model.191 Attempts have already been made by researchers to extract 
                                                      
190 See Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 
on the legal protection of databases. Case law on the EU database right both in the CJEU and 
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ML algorithms such as search algorithms are protected as trade secrets. See especially Viacom 
Intern. Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 259-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
191 See relevant literature on small disjuncts in machine learning. Weiss (supra note 155); 
Andrea Pohoreckyj Danyluk and Foster Provost, Small disjuncts in action: Learning to diagnose 
errors in the local loop of the telephone network, in ICMLÕ93, 81Ð88 (1993). In many cases of 
53 | Edwards and Veale [draft, July 3 2017] | Slave to the algorithm? 
personal data in this way as a form of ÒadversarialÓ ML. An attacker might 
attempt to query, observe or externally influence a ML system to obtain private 
information about some or all individuals within its training set.192 In this type 
of attack, individual records can be recovered from a model with high 
probability. Indeed, some applications of ML specifically utilise this 
characteristic to try and improve or better understand data compression 
techniques.193 
Assuming that some grounds for erasure were established, for a data 
controller, requests for erasure of personal data from an ML model would not 
always be straightforward as it might involve retraining the model and, 
especially, revising the features of that model.194 This would be problematic as 
the high computational and labour costs of ML systems restrict many 
organisationsÕ practical capacities for constant retraining of the model when 
either new data, or indeed, requests for erasure come in. In these situations, 
swift and easy erasure is likely difficult to achieve. Computationally faster 
approaches to Ômachine unlearningÕ have been proposed, but still require 
retraining and would require foundational changes to model architectures and 
processes to use.195 
                                                      
modern machine learning that are less understandable in terms of rules, then this is more of an 
illustrative set of literature than one that is directly applicable. 
192 See the literature on model inversion attacks, including Matt Fredrikson et al. Model 
inversion attacks that exploit confidence information and basic countermeasures, in CCSÕ 15, 
OCTOBER 12Ð16 2015, DENVER, COLORADO, USA (2016), doi:10.1145/2810103.2813677; for 
attacks against machine learning, see generally Ling Huang et al., Adversarial ML, AISEC Õ11, 43Ð
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193 D Sculley and Carla E. Brodley, Compression and ML: A new perspective on feature 
space vectors, DATA COMPRESSION CONFERENCE (DCCÕ06) 332Ð341 (2006); George Toderici et al., 
Full Resolution Image Compression with Recurrent Neural Networks, ARXIV [CS.CV] (2016), 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1608.05148. 
194 Pedro Domingos, A few useful things to know about ML, 55 COMMUN. ACM 10, 78Ð87 
(2012). Retraining might only involve a single piece of data, such as transforming a postcode 
into geospatial coordinates. In this kind of case, an erasure request is simple. However if a 
variable is constructed by reference to other inputs Ð e.g. the distance of an input from the 
mean, which involves all data points Ñ then complete erasure might require recalculation of the 
whole dataset. 
195 Yinzhi Cao and Junfeng Yang, Towards Making Systems Forget with Machine Unlearning, 
in SPÕ15 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2015 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY, MAY 17Ð21, 463Ð480 
(2015). 
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5.2.1.4! Model trading and the right to erasure 
A rising business model involves the trading or publishing196 of trained 
models without the data which was used to train them. For example, GoogleÕs 
ML models syntaxnet for parsing sentences (into the relations between verbs, 
propositions and nouns, for example) is based on proprietary treebank data197, 
while the word embedding model word2vec (to map which words have similar 
meanings to each other, in which ways) uses closed access text from Google 
News198 is also available. Can a data subject withdraw their personal data in 
some useful way from a model which has been traded? This presents interesting 
and extremely difficult legal challenges to the right to erasure. 
Art 17(2) of the GDPR is an obvious starting point. It provides that where a 
controller has made personal data ÒpublicÓ but is asked to erase, then they are 
to take Òreasonable steps, including technical measuresÓ to inform other 
controllers processing the same personal data that the data subject has 
requested the erasure by them of Òany links to, or copy of, or replication of, 
those personal dataÓ. 
This is a difficult provision to map to ML model trading. It clearly had in 
contemplation the more familiar scenarios of, say, reposted social media posts, 
or reposted links to webpages. First, are models sold under conditions of 
commercial confidentiality, or within proprietary access-restricted systems, 
made ÒpublicÓ? If not, the right does not operate. Was a "copy" or ÒreplicationÓ 
of the personal data made? Again, if we regard the model as a structure derived 
from personal data rather than personal data itself, neither of these applies. Was 
there a Òlink toÓ that original personal data? This seems more possible, but it is 
still rather a linguistic stretch. 
Finally art 17(2) makes it plain that a controller is only obliged to do this as 
far as is reasonable, Òtaking account of available technology and the cost of 
implementationÓ. Even if all these problems are met, the obligation is only on 
the model-seller to ÒinformÓ. There is no obligation on the controller to whom 
the model was traded to do anything with this information. The data subject 
would, it seems, have to make another erasure request to that controller, unless 
they chose to redact the model voluntarily. 
5.2.2! GDPR, article 20: the right to data portability 
Article 20 provides that data subjects have the right to receive their personal 
data, ÒprovidedÓ to a controller, in a Òstructured, commonly used and machine 
readable formatÓ, and that they then have the right to transmit that data to 
another controller Òwithout hindranceÓ. Data portability is conceptually a sibling 
right to art 17. In theory, a data subject can ask for their data to be erased from 
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197 See Tensorflor, Syntaxnet, GITHUB, 
https://github.com/tensorflow/models/tree/master/syntaxnet [Retrieved 15 February 2017]. 
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one site (e.g. Google) and at the same time ported into their own hands.199 Data 
subjects can also ask for data to be ported directly from controller A, who 
currently is processing it, to a controller B of their own choice.200 Data portability 
is aimed explicitly at allowing data subjects to gain greater control over their 
personal data for consumer protection more than privacy purposes Ñ e.g. by 
allowing them to retrieve billing or transaction data from energy companies or 
banks Ñ and re-use it in their own preferred ways to save money or gain 
advantages.201 
In the context of ML, it is possible to imagine art 20 rights being used to 
facilitate user control over their personal data and possibly, the inferences 
drawn from it. It has often been suggested that data subjects might safeguard 
their privacy by adopting use of what are sometimes known as Personal Data 
Containers (PDCs). Using these technologies, the idea is that personal data need 
not be shared to secure desired services from giants such as Google or Facebook, 
who then use that data for their own profiling purposes, but rather the subject 
only provides an index of the data, keeping their own data either on their own 
server or perhaps in a trusted cloud storage. The philosophy behind this goes 
back several decades, to the idea that an Òend-to-endÓ principle on the internet 
would empower the edges of a network, and avoid centralisation.202 Proponents 
of data containers, which encompass research projects such as DataBox and Hub 
of all Things (HaT)203, argue that these devices in your own homes or pockets 
might help you to archive data about yourself, coordinate processing with your 
data, and guard against threats.204 Art 20 rights might enable data subjects to 
withdraw their personal data into PDCs in order to establish more informational 
self-determination in comparison to suffering the vagaries of profiling. 
However, as Hildebrandt points out, what we increasingly want is not a right 
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INNOVATION AND SKILLSM, REVIEW OF THE MIDATA VOLUNTARY PROGRAMME (HM Government, 2014), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/midata-voluntary-programme-review 
202 See LARRY LESSIG, CODE 2.0. (Basic Books, 2006) at 111; see also visions of this in the 
marketing literature, such as ALAN MITCHELL, RIGHT SIDE UP (HarperCollins, 2002). 
203 See discussion in Lachlan Urquhart et al., Realising the Right to Data Portability for the 
Internet of Things (March 15, 2017), doi:10.2139/ssrn.2933448. 
204 Richard Mortier et al., The Personal Container or Your Life in Bits, DIGITAL FUTURES Ô10, 
OCTOBER 11Ð12, 2010, NOTTINGHAM, UK (2010), http://mor1.github.io/publications/pdf/de10-
perscon.pdf 
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not to be profiled Ñ which means effectively secluding ourselves from society 
and its benefits Ñ but to determine how we are profiled and on the basis of 
what data Ñ a "right how to be read"205. Using art 20 portability rights, a data 
subject might choose to take their data to a controller whose model appealed to 
them from a market of choices: perhaps on the basis of a certification against 
particular values (see below) Ñ rather than simply accept the model used by 
Google or its ilk. 
This is no panacea, and there are a number of clear problems with using art 
20 this way. First, is it likely the ordinary consumer would have either the 
information or the motivation to Òshop aroundÓ for models in this way? Given 
the well-known inertia of consumers even about quite straightforward choices 
(e.g. switching energy suppliers, ISPs or banks to save money or get better 
service), it seems difficult to believe they could make this fairly esoteric choice 
without considerable improvements such as labelling or certification of 
algorithms (see section 6 below). It will take a long time for a competing 
marketplace of algorithmic model choices to emerge and indeed it is hard to see 
the current marketplace taking to such voluntarily.206 Sometimes, as in criminal 
justice systems, it is hard to see how competing suppliers of models could 
emerge at all. On a practical point, it is quite possible that although the data 
subject may in theory gain greater control over their personal data, in reality 
they may not have the knowledge or time to safeguard their data against 
emerging threats. 
Secondly, from a legal perspective, art 20 is (much like art 22) hedged 
around with what often seem capricious restrictions. It only applies to data the 
subject ÒprovidesÓ. There seems no clear consensus on whether this covers just 
the explicit data a person provides (e.g. their name, hobbies, photos etc. on 
Facebook); the meta data the user supplies unknowingly (e.g. which pictures 
they look at, what links they click on, who is in their friends graph); or most 
damningly, the inferences that are then drawn from that data by the ML or 
profiling system itself. The Article 29 Working Party suggests that both the data 
a data subject provides directly, and data provided by ÒobservingÓ a data subject, 
is subject to portability; but data inferred from these are not.207 Furthermore art 
20 only applies to data provided by ÒconsentÓ (art 20(a)) Ñ accordingly if data 
has been collected and profiled under another lawful ground such as the 
                                                      
205 Hildebrandt, supra note 64. 
206 It is beyond the scope of this paper to get into the economic and competition arguments 
here but it is already clear that information intermediaries occupying monopolistic or 
oligopolistic positions in the marketplace will not be keen on relinquishing them without 
regulatory command: this has already been seen in the UK in its attempts to introduce the 
midata scheme to the energy markets (supra note 201). 
207 See early guidance from Article 29 Working Party: A29 WP, GUIDELINES ON THE RIGHT TO 
DATA portability, 16/EN. WP 242 (Dec. 13, 2016). See further possible consequences of this for 
GDPR rights in section 6.2.2 above. 
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legitimate interests of the data controller, no right to portability exists.208 Lastly 
it is worth emphasising this right only covers data which was being processed 
by Òautomated meansÓ (art 20(1)(b)) Ñ though not, as in art 22, ÒsolelyÓ 
automated means! 
6! BEYOND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE GDPR: PRIVACY BY DESIGN 
The GDPR discussion so far has revolved around rights given to individual 
data subjects. Although section 2.2 above demonstrates that algorithms create 
societal harms, such as discrimination against racial or minority groups, a focus 
on DP remedies makes an individual rights approach inevitable. DP is a 
paradigm based on human rights which means it does not contemplate, as 
discussed above, remedies for groups (or indeed, for non-living persons such as 
corporations, or the deceased209). 
This means that even if the rights we have discussed above Ñ arts 22, 15(h), 
17 and 20 especially Ñ do become valuable tools for individuals to try to 
ÒenslaveÓ the algorithm, it is still up to individual data subjects to exercise them. 
This is not easy, as we noted in our section 5.1 on Ònotice and choiceÓ and 
transparency fallacies. This is even truer perhaps in the EU where consumers 
are on the whole far less prepared and empowered to litigate than in the US. 
The UK and many other EU nations have no generic system of class actions; this 
has been seen as a problem for many years, but attempts to solve it on an EU 
wide basis have repeatedly stalled.210 Individuals are further hampered in 
meaningfully attaining civil justice by a general prejudice against contingency 
lawyering combined with dwindling levels of civil legal aid. 
The DP regime contemplates that data subjects may find it hard to enforce 
their rights by placing general oversight in the hands of the independent 
regulator each state must have211 (its DP Authority or DPA). However, DPAs are 
often critically underfunded since they must be independent of both state and 
commerce. They are often also significantly understaffed in terms of the kind of 
technical expertise necessary to understand and police algorithmic harms. In 
fact, financial constraints have in fact pushed DPAs such as the UKÕs ICO towards 
a much more Òpublic administrativeÓ role than one would expect, where 
                                                      
208 This bizarre choice can only be explained by thinking of art 20 as a solution to promote 
competition by allowing data subjects to make active choices to retrieve their voluntarily posted 
data from social networks. 
209 Lilian Edwards and Edina Harbinja, Protecting Post-Mortem Privacy: Reconsidering the 
Privacy Interests of the Deceased in a Digital World, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT LAW 
JOURNAL 1 (2013), doi:10.2139/ssrn.2267388. 
210 It is of course possible for individual EU states in domestic law to provide class action 
rights but it is simply not a traditional or prevalent feature of these legal systems. The UK has 
made some legislative exceptions lately: e.g. the Consumer Rights Act 2015 allows collective 
proceedings and collective settlement orders in the Competition Appeal Tribunal Ð but this is 
only in relation to breach of competition rules, and does not apply to all consumer rights in the 
2015 Act let alone all legal rights in the UK system, including the DP regime. 
211 See GDPR, art 51. 
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problems (e.g. spamming, cold calling, cookies) are looked at more in the round 
as societal ills, than via championing individual data subject complaints. 
Is it possible to derive any ways forward from the GDPR that are more likely 
to secure a better algorithmic society as a whole, rather than merely providing 
individual users with rights as tools which they may find impossible to wield to 
any great effect? 
6.1! ÒBig data due processÓ and neutral data arbiters 
It is interesting, looking from Europe, to observe how the predominantly 
North American legal literature has tried to solve the problems of algorithmic 
governance without the low-hanging fruit of a DPÐbased Òright to an 
explanationÓ. One notable bank of literature explores the idea of Òbig data due 
processÓ. Crawford and Schultz212 (drawing on early work by Citron213) 
interestingly attempt to model how due process rights already familiar to US 
citizens could be adapted to provide fairness, agency and transparency in cases 
around algorithmic automated systems in the governmental sector. CitronÕs 
work argues214 for a number of radical adaptations to conventional due process 
which might include: 
-! extra education about the Òbiases and fallaciesÓ of automation for 
government agencies using automated systems; 
-! agencies to hire Òhearing officersÓ to explain in detail their reliance on the 
outputs of such systems to make administrative decisions, including any 
Òcomputer generated facts or legal findingsÓ; 
-! agencies to be required to regularly test systems for bias and other errors; 
-! audit trails to be issued by systems and notice to subjects that they have 
been used to make decisions, such that judicial review is possible. 
Crawford and Schultz take these ideas of re-modelled due process and note 
they fit better into a model of structural rather than individualised due 
process.215 For opaque predictive systems where data subjects never become 
aware of opportunities they might have had, reliance on individual rights and 
awareness is deeply problematic. In a structural approach, oversight and 
auditing can primarily be driven by public agencies. They suggest a Òneutral 
data arbiterÓ with rights to investigate complaints from those whose data is used 
in predictive automatic systems, and provide a kind of Òjudicial reviewÓ by 
reviewing audit trails to find bias and unfairness that might render automated 
decisions invalid. This idea of an external regulator or audit body which might 
investigate complaints and provide mediation or adjudication is one with clear 
                                                      
212 Crawford and Schultz, supra note 12 at 123. 
213 Citron, supra note 14. 
214 Interestingly, she rejects as part of the Òopportunity to be heardÓ a simple right to access 
to the algorithmÕs source code and/or a hearing on the logic of its decision as too expensive 
under the balancing test in Matthews v Eldridge (Citron, supra note 14 at 1284). 
215 Crawford and Schultz, supra note 12 at 124. 
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appeal in the literature: Crawford and Schultz suggest the FTC might act as a 
model but Tutt, for example, suggests an ÒFDA for algorithmsÓ.216 
Seen through European eyes, two problems quickly emerge. One, the EU DP 
regime applies to private and public sector alike and in the private sector, it is 
harder to see these Òdue processÓ measures being taken on-board without 
compulsion or external funding. As we noted above, whereas transparency is a 
default in the public sector, the opposite is true in the private sector. Two, we 
essentially already have Òneutral data arbitersÓ in the form of the state DPAs, 
and as just discussed, they are already struggling to regulate general privacy 
issues now let alone these more complex and opaque societal algorithmic harms. 
6.2! Data Protection Impact Assessments and certification schemes 
However the GDPR introduces a number of new provisions which do not 
confer individual rights but rather attempt to create an environment in which 
less ÒtoxicÓ automated systems will be built in future. These ideas come out of 
the long evolution of Òprivacy by designÓ (PbD) engineering as a way to build 
privacy-aware or privacy-friendly systems, starting from the beginning of the 
process of design rather than Òtacking privacy on at the end!Ó. They recognise 
that a regulator cannot do everything by top down control, but that controllers 
must themselves be involved in the design of less privacy-invasive systems. 
These provisions include requirements that: 
-! controllers must, at the time systems are developed as well as at the time of 
actual processing, implement Òappropriate technical and organisational 
measuresÓ to protect the rights of data subjects (GDPR, art 25). In particular, 
Òdata protection by defaultÓ is required so that only personal data necessary 
for processing are gathered. Suggestions for PbD include pseudonymisation 
and data minimisation; 
-! when a type of processing using ÒnewÓ technologies is Òlikely to result in a 
high riskÓ to the rights of data subjects, then there must be a prior Data 
Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) (art 35); 
-! every public authority and every Òlarge scaleÓ private sector controller and 
any controller who processes the ÒspecialÓ categories of data under art 9 
(sensitive personal data) must appoint a Data Protection Officer (DPO)(art 
37); 
DPIAs especially have tremendous implications for ML design217. PIAs (as 
they were formerly known) have traditionally been voluntary measures, in 
practice largely taken up by public bodies bound to compliance and audit, such 
as health trusts. Attempts to expand their take up in Europe into areas like 
                                                      
216 See Tutt, supra note 13. Other suggestions for algorithmic audit are usefully compiled by 
Mittelstadt et al, supra note 27 at 49. 
217 Ben Shneiderman, The dangers of faulty, biased, or malicious algorithms requires 
independent oversight, 113 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE 48 (2016). 
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RFID218 and the Internet of Things219 by the private sector have in the main been 
unsuccessful. However the new art 35 is compulsory, not voluntary, and its 
definitions of Òhigh riskÓ technologies are almost certain to capture many if not 
most ML systems. Art 35(3) (a) requires a DPIA where in particular there is a 
Òsystematic and extensive evaluation of personal aspects relating to natural 
persons [É] based on automated processing, including profiling [É] and on 
which decisions are based that produce legal effects concerning the natural 
person or similarly significantly affect the natural person.Ó 
This is almost identical to the formulation used in art 22. The ICO in their 
guidance report on Big Data, AI and ML220 note firmly that Òpotential privacy 
risksÓ have already been identified with Òthe use of inferred data and predictive 
analyticsÓ. Accordingly, they provide a draft DPIA for big data analytics (Annex 
1). It seems clear that, despite the uncertainty of the Òhigh riskÓ threshold, DPIAs 
are quite likely to become the required norm for algorithmic systems, especially 
where sensitive personal data, such as race or political opinion, is processed on 
a Òlarge scaleÓ (art 35(3)(b)).221 
Where a DPIA is carried out and indicates a Òhigh riskÓ, then the local 
member state DPA must be consulted before the system can be launched. The 
impact assessment must be shared and the DPA must provide written advice to 
the controller and can use their powers to temporarily or permanently ban use 
of the system. Given the fines that can also be levied against non-compliant 
controllers under the GDPR (in the worst cases, up to 4% of global turnover222) 
                                                      
218 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION IMPACT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK 
FOR RFID APPLICATIONS (Jan. 12, 2011), http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/enet/documents/rfid-
pia-framework-final.pdf. 
219 See the Data Protection Impact Assessment Template supported by Commission 
Recommendation 2014/724/EU, Smart Grid task Force 2012-14, Expert Group 2: Regulatory 
Recommendations for Privacy, Data Protection and Cybersecurity in the Smart Grid 
Environment, Data Protection Impact Assessment Template for Smart Grid and Smart Metering 
Systems (Mar. 18, 2014), 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/DPIA%20template_incl%20line%20nu
mbers.pdf. 
220 ICO, supra note 4. 
221 See also A29 WP, Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and 
determining whether processing is Òlikely to result in a high riskÓ for the purposes of Regulation 
2016/679 (Apr. 4, 2017). Judging by this guidance, almost every machine learning system 
seems likely to require a DPIA. 
222 Art 83, GDPR. For potentially less severe transgressions, the maximum fine is the higher 
of 10m or 2% of global turnover, while for potentially more severe transgressions, the 
maximum fine is the higher of 20m or 4% of global turnover. 
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this is potentially a very effective method to tame unfair ML systems223. Binns 
describes this as a kind of regulatory ÒtriageÓ.224 
The voluntary measures of the GDPR may be equally influential for ML 
systems. Article 42 proposes voluntary ÒcertificationÓ of controllers and 
processors to demonstrate compliance with the Regulation, with Òcertification 
mechanismsÓ and the development of Òseals and marksÓ to be encouraged by 
EU member states.225 In the UK, a tender has already been advertised by the ICO 
for a certification authority to run a UK privacy seal226, although progress has 
been interrupted by the vote to exit the European Union, and the subsequent 
political turmoil. 
Taken together, these provisions offer exciting opportunities to 
operationalise CitronÕs Òbig data due processÓ rights and Crawford and SchultzÕs 
Òprocedural due processÓ. Certification could be applied to two main aspects of 
algorithmic systems: 
a)! certification of the algorithm as a software object by 
a.! directly specifying either its design specifications or the process 
of its design, such as the expertise involved (technology-based 
standards, assuming good practices lead to good outcomes) 
b.! and/or specifying output-related requirements that can be 
monitored and evaluated (performance-based standards); 
b)! certification of the whole person or process using the system to make 
decisions, which would consider algorithms as situated in the context of 
their use. CitronÕs Òhearing officersÓ, for example, might be provided by 
such provisions, perhaps as a form of alternate dispute resolution. 
In these cases, not only could fairness and discrimination issues be 
considered in the standards to certify against227, but it could be an opportunity 
to proactively encourage the creation of more scrutable algorithms. 
                                                      
223 In other work, one author has suggested that PIAs could be developed into more holistic 
Social Impact Assessments (SIAs) and although this was developed to deal with the IoT it might 
also have considerable application to ML systems: see Lilian Edwards et al., From Privacy Impact 
Assessment to Social Impact Assessment, in 2016 IEEE SECURITY AND PRIVACY WORKSHOPS (SPW), 
53Ð57 (2016), doi:10.1109/SPW.2016.19.  
224 Reuben Binns, Data protection impact assessments: a meta-regulatory approach, 7 
INTERNATIONAL DATA PRIVACY LAW 1, 22 (2017), doi:10.1093/idpl/ipw027. 
225 For an early analysis of these provisions, see Rowena Rodrigues et al., Developing a 
privacy seal scheme (that works), 3 INTERNATIONAL DATA PRIVACY LAW 2 100Ð116 (2013), doi: 
10.1093/idpl/ips037. 
226 Gemma Farmer ÒWhatÕs the latest on the ICO privacy seals?Ó (2015) Information 
CommissionerÕs Office Blog. Retrieved from 
https://iconewsblog.wordpress.com/2015/08/28/whats-the-latest-on-the-ico-privacy-seals/  
227 Issues of algorithmic fairness are specifically discussed in GDPR, recital 71. Tristan 
Henderson in private correspondence has suggested that a certifying authority might well under 
at 42 be given the power to require explanation facilities, thus side stepping the art 22/15(h) 
debate. 
62 | Edwards and Veale [draft, July 3 2017] | Slave to the algorithm? 
One notable advantage is that certification standards could be set on a per-
sector basis. This is already very common in other sociotechnical areas, such as 
environmental sustainability standards, where the standards for different 
environmental and labour harms in different certification systems such as 
SAN/Rainforest Alliance and Fair Trade also differ by crop. As we note, 
explanations and their effectiveness differ strongly by type (sections 4.1 and 5) 
domain (section 4.2) and user seeking explanation (4.3), and it is likely that the 
exact form of any truly useful explanation-based remedy would vary strongly 
across both these and other factors. Certification could be augmented by the 
development of codes of conduct (arts 40 and 41, GDPR) for any specified 
sector, such as for algorithms considering housing allocation systems, targeted 
advertising, tax fraud detection or recidivism. 
Promising as this may sound, voluntary self-or co-regulation by privacy seal 
has had a bad track record in privacy, with recurring issues around regulatory 
and stakeholder capture. The demise of Safe Harbor alone228, which was 
externally validated for years by trust seals like TrustE, means that many 
Europeans will be rightly sceptical about the delivery of real corporate change 
and substantive compliance with privacy rights by certification229. 
Another issue is that DPIAs, PbD, certification and the general principle of 
ÒaccountabilityÓ230 in the GDPR bring with them a real danger of formalistic 
bureaucratic overkill alongside a lack of substantive change: a happy vision for 
more form-filling jobs and ticked boxes, but a sad one for a world where 
automated algorithms do their jobs quietly without imperilling human rights 
and freedoms, especially privacy and autonomy. 
6.3! Conclusions 
Algorithms, particularly of the ML variety, are increasingly used to make 
decisions about individualsÕ lives but have caused a range of concerns. 
Transparency in the form of a Òright to an explanationÓ has emerged as a 
compellingly attractive remedy since it intuitively presents as a means to Òopen 
the black boxÓ, hence allowing individual challenge and redress, as well as 
possibilities to foster accountability of ML systems. In the general furore over 
algorithmic bias, opacity and unfairness laid out in section 2, any remedy in a 
storm has looked attractive. 
In this article, we traced how, despite these hopes, a right to an explanation 
in the GDPR seems unlikely to help us find complete remedies, particularly in 
some of the core Òalgorithmic war storiesÓ that have shaped recent attitudes in 
this domain. A few reasons underpin this conclusions. Firstly (section 3), the 
law is restrictive on when any explanation-related right can be triggered, and in 
                                                      
228 See CJEU case of Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner of Ireland, Case C-362/14, 6 
October 2015. 
229 See on the failure of TrustE and similar privacy seals to meet European privacy 
standards, Charlesworth (cite from 2nd edn Law and Internet). 
230 GDPR art 5(2). There is not time to discuss this fully in this article, but it is likely to 
support the creation of a new world of form-filling for data controllers. 
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many places is unclear, or even seems paradoxical. Secondly (section 4), even 
were some of these restrictions to be navigated (such as with decisive case law), 
the way that explanations are conceived of legally - as Òmeaningful information 
about the logic of processingÓ - is unlikely to be provided by the kind of ML 
ÒexplanationsÓ computer scientists have been developing. 
ML explanations are restricted both by the type of explanation sought, the 
multi-dimensionality of the domain and the type of user seeking an explanation. 
However (section 5) Òsubject-centricÕ explanations (SCEs), which restrict 
explanations to particular regions of a model around a query, show promise. In 
particular we suggest these are not just usable, as Wachter et al.231 argue, Òafter 
an automated decision has taken placeÓ, but might be put into interactive 
systems that allow individuals to explore and build their own mental models of 
complex algorithms. Similarly ÒpedagogicalÓ systems which create explanations 
around a model rather than from decomposing it may also be useful and benefit 
from not relying on disclosure of proprietary secrets or IP. 
As an interim conclusion then, while convinced that recent research in ML 
explanations shows promise, we fear that, given the preconceptions in the legal 
wording of provisions like the GDPR art 15(h), the search for a legally 
enforceable right to an explanation may be at best distracting and at worst 
nurture a new kind of Òtransparency fallacyÓ to match the existing phenomenon 
of Òmeaningless consentÓ (section 6.1). So, as our last exercise, we turned our 
focus to the other legal rights of the GDPR which might aid those impacted 
adversely by ML systems. We noted with caution some possible uses of the 
GDPRÕs Òright to erasureÓ and the Òright to data portabilityÓ to ÒslaveÓ the 
algorithm, but found that, like the Òright to an explanationÓ, these rely too much 
on individual rights for what are too often group harms. 
However, radically, in section 6 we found that some of the new tools in the 
GDPR, in particular the mandatory requirements for Privacy by Design and 
DPIAs, and opportunities for certification systems, might go beyond the 
individual to focus a priori on the creation of better algorithms, as well as 
creative ways for individuals to be assured about algorithmic governance e.g. 
by certification of performance, or of the professionals building or using 
algorithms. Starting from a notion of creating better systems, with less opacity, 
clearer audit trails, well and holistically trained designers, and input from 
concerned publics232 seems eminently more appealing than grimly pursuing 
against the odds a ÒmeaningfulÓ version of the interior of a black box. 
6.3.1! Further work 
There are other matters which have only been hinted at in this already long 
article and which we hope to explore in further work. One is oversight and audit. 
Any system based on GDPR rights ultimately puts the supervisory burden on the 
                                                      
231 Wachter et al., supra note 11. 
232 See GDPR art 35(7)(9) which suggests when conducting a DPIA that the views of data 
subjects shall be sought when appropriate but (always a catch) Òwithout prejudice toÓ 
commercial secrecy or security. 
64 | Edwards and Veale [draft, July 3 2017] | Slave to the algorithm? 
state DPA. Is this correct? We have already seen that DPAs are overwhelmed by 
the task of managing privacy enforcement in the digital era. Is every algorithmic 
harm also their bailiwick? Does this extend to datasets steeped in societal racial 
bias, driverless trolley-cars that cannot understand whether to mow down one 
person or five233, identification systems that think only light skinned people are 
beautiful234 and social media algorithms that distribute fake news? All of these 
involve the processing of personal data at some level, but they do not relate to 
privacy except in the loosest sense. There is an overarching issue here about 
whether simply because Òdata protectionÓ has the word data in it, should it 
acquire hegemony over all the ills of data-driven society? 
Furthermore, what about ML systems that mainly deal with non-personal 
data? Should they be excluded from any DP based governance system? The EU 
already thinks, from an economic perspective, that the lack of rights over non-
personal data is a problem waiting to happen235. On the other hand, the 
limitation of scope to personal data could be seen as an advantage: in a recent 
UK Parliamentary consultation on how to regulate algorithms, the Royal Society 
complained that: 
ÒMachine learning algorithms are just computer programs, and the range 
and extent of their use is extremely broad and extremely diverse. It would be 
odd, unwieldy, and intrusive to suggest governance for all uses of computer 
programming, and the same general argument would apply to all uses of 
machine learning. 
[É] In many or most contexts machine learning is generally 
uncontroversial, and does not need a new governance framework. How a 
company uses machine learning to improve its energy usage or warehouse 
facilities, how an individual uses machine learning to plan their travel, or how 
a retailer uses machine learning to recommend additional products to 
consumers would not seem to require changes to governance. It should of course 
be subject to the law, and also involve appropriate data use. 
Many of the issues around machine learning algorithms are very context 
specific, so it would be unhelpful to create a general governance framework or 
governance body for all machine learning applications. Issues around safety and 
proper testing in transport applications are likely to be better handled by 
existing bodies in that sector; questions about validation of medical applications 
                                                      
233 See passim the glorious Trolley problem memes page at 
https://www.facebook.com/TrolleyProblemMemes/. 
234 See Dave Neal, FaceApp sorry for suggesting that light skin is 'hotter' than dark skin, THE 
INQUIRER (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/3008961/faceapp-sorry-
for-suggesting-that-light-skin-is-hotter-than-dark-skin . 
235 European Commission, Public consultation on Building the European Data Economy (Jan. 
10, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/public-consultation-building-
european-data-economy. 
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of machine learning by existing medical regulatory bodies; those around 
applications of machine learning in personal finance by financial regulators.236Ó 
We have already noted that sectors are likely to have specific needs for 
explanation and that a sectoral approach might be fostered by certification. In 
a world apparently scrambling to create as many new bodies as possible for 
various types of oversight of AI, ML and algorithmic decision making in 
embodied forms such as robots237, it is worth keeping a sectorÐspecific, purpose-
driven sentiment in mind. 
As we have already noted, many of the problems with algorithms are more 
problems for groups than for individuals. Remedies aimed at empowering or 
protecting groups Ñ remedies such as Òan FDA for algorithmsÓ or a 
ÒsupercomplaintÓ system to empower third party organisations, or a European-
style ombudsman body Ñ may be more useful things to consider and reinvent 
than struggling to transform the individual rights paradigm of DP. 
Finally, this work has been a true (and sometimes heated) interdisciplinary 
collaboration between (reductively) a DP lawyer and an ML specialist. Any 
attempts to increase the transparency or explicability of ML systems, and 
indeed, in general to better harness them to social good, will not function 
effectively without this kind of interdisciplinary work. We need to consider 
algorithms in the sociotechnical context within which they work. We will, as 
Mireille Hildebrandt describes, Òhave to involve cognitive scientists, computer 
engineers, lawyers, designers of interfaces and experts in human-computer 
interaction with a clear understanding of what is at stake in terms of democracy 
and the rule of lawÓ.238 
We thus end with a reiteration of the common plea for collegiate work not 
only across different legal jurisdictions and across different disciplines, but also 
between academics and practitioners. In relation to applied domains in 
particular, we fear that the situation is becoming more adversarial than 
collaborative, and that colleagues risk burning bridges with the very practitioner 
communities they should be working with, rather than against. Only with 
continuing trans-disciplinary collaboration can we hope not just to enslave the 
algorithm, but to create a more legitimate, more comprehensible and in the end 
more useful algorithmic society. 
 
                                                      
236 This submission is primarily drawn from the recent report: Machine learning: The power 
and promise of computers that learn by example (The Royal Society, 2017).  
237 See Commons Science and Technology Committee, The Big Data Dilemma (UK 
Parliament, 2016); Commons Science and Technology Committee, Robotics and artificial 
intelligence, (UK Parliament, 2016); The Conservative Party, The Conservative and Unionist 
Party 2017 Manifesto (2017) at 79; European Parliament, Report with recommendations to the 
Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, 2015/2103(INL). 
238 Hildebrandt, supra note 11 at 54. 
